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Biography of Keith Woodward
Figure 1. Keith Woodward, portrait.
Source: Photograph by Fleur Woodward, July 2014.
Keith Woodward was born in Ismailia, Egypt in 1930. He was educated at 
Probus School, Plymouth College and Keble College, Oxford, graduating in 
Modern History in 1951. In 1953 he joined the British National Service in the 
New Hebrides as office assistant, was promoted to be Assistant Secretary in 
1957, and Administrative Officer, Class A in 1970. Woodward dealt with a wide 
variety of administrative matters during his twenty-five years at the British 
Residency, including Condominium Personnel, Agriculture, District Affairs, 
Land, Education, Health and Constitutional Development, holding the post of 
Secretary for Political Affairs from 1968, until his retirement (because of failing 
eyesight) in 1978. He had a major part in setting up the Port Vila Cultural Centre 
(1961–62), and was Hon. Secretary to the Board of Management for sixteen 
years. He was also much involved with the introduction of Scouting (under the 
aegis of the British Commonwealth Scouting Movement), serving from 1956 as 
secretary to the Scout Council and later as Chairman. Woodward was awarded 
the MBE in 1964, the OBE in 1976 and the Vanuatu Independence Medal in 
1980. Keith lives in retirement in Bath, UK.

Preface
This is a fascinating memoir written by Keith Woodward many years after he 
left the then New Hebrides where he worked for almost twenty-five years in the 
British Administration. Although he is modest about his own contributions in 
these years, Keith played a significant role in the moves towards self-government, 
an innovative, electoral system and ultimately, in 1980, independence when 
the country became Vanuatu. This work not only led to his award of an OBE 
but a Vanuatu Independence Medal. It will be an invaluable history not just 
for those ni-Vanuatu who lived through those momentous and turbulent years 
leading up to independence but for those of subsequent generations. It will 
also be a great resource for scholars of the decolonisation process and political 
history of Vanuatu and the Pacific more broadly. In addition, it highlights the 
complexity of the relations between British and French colonialisms in the 
archipelago and the region.
I would like to thank both Brian Bresnihan and Michael Allen for their excellent 
photos from the period and Keith’s daughter Fleur for the recent photograph of 
her father. I am also grateful to Brian for permission to reproduce his photograph 
of the painting of the British Administration buildings by Olla Reeve which is 
in his collection. I thank Mitiana Arbon for his excellent cover design using two 
historical photographs provided by Brian and Michael respectively. 
Thanks also to Stewart Firth the Chair of the Pacific Editorial Board of ANU 
Press and its members for their enthusiasm about this book and the excellent 
insights and positive suggestions which came from two anonymous readers, 
whom we now know were Howard Van Trease and Gregory Rawlings. Finally, 
I must thank my colleague Carolyn Brewer who has as always done an excellent 
job of copyediting of the manuscript and conversion to ANU Press style 
with grace and speed and ANU Press staff for their prompt and professional 





I am grateful to The Australian National University for publishing this memoir, 
and so conferring on it a totally unexpected distinction. I am grateful also to my 
old friend Bob Makin, formerly Director of Radio Vanuatu, for suggesting that I 
should put my memories of the Condominium on paper, and to Margaret Jolly, 
ARC Laureate Fellow and Professor at The Australian National University, for 
recommending their publication and for subsequently giving priority to this 
task. My very warm thanks are due to Professor Michael Allen, formerly Head 
of Anthropology, University of Sydney, for editing the memoir. As Michael and 
I have been friends since meeting in the Condominium when we were quite 
young men, it is particularly gratifying that he also supported publication. I 
am grateful to Dr Gregory Rawlings of the University of Otago, and to Professor 
Howard Van Trease, formerly of the University of the South Pacific, and the 
University of Hawai’i for their favourable reviews of my manuscript. Lastly, 
but far from least, my very special thanks to Brian Bresnihan MBE, many years 
ago my colleague in the New Hebrides British National Service, and friend ever 
since. Brian has devoted many, many hours to preparing my manuscript for 
editing and, because I am blind, in reading for me on tape the edited version, 
together with all the correspondence connected with publication, which would 




A Political Memoir of the  
Anglo-French Condominium  
of the New Hebrides
Arrival: Port Vila, Santo and the Condominium
I arrived in the New Hebrides by Qantas flying boat on 26 March 1953. 
As viewed from the harbour the town could not have looked very different from 
the Port Vila that Edward Jacomb enthused over upon his arrival on a Burns 
Philp steamer in 1907.1 There was no water-front reclamation, Fila Island canoes 
were drawn up along the beach and the great majority of the buildings were 
constructed of wood with red or green roofs, many of them being hidden by the 
luxuriant vegetation.
I had come out from England to take up a junior post at the British Residency 
(BR). The British Resident Commissioner (BRC) was Brigadier H.J.M. Flaxman, 
but he was on leave when I arrived and Mr. Bernard Blackwell, an Australian, 
was acting Resident Commissioner. He had married a sister of the well-known 
British settler, Geoffrey Seagoe. M. Pierre Anthonioz was then the French 
Resident Commissioner (FRC) and had moved into a new French Residency (FR) 
only the year before—into the building which was to become State House, the 
official residence of the first President of Vanuatu, until it was unfortunately 
wrecked by Hurricane Uma in 1987. This was a very modern building and quite 
unlike any other in Port Vila. One witty soul said of it, ‘C’est magnifique, mais ce 
n’est pas la gare’ (It is beautiful, but it is not the railway station)! The BRC lived 
in splendid isolation at the top of 185 steps on Iririki Island, in a predominantly 
wooden structure that dated back to 1903.
The British and French judges of the Joint Court were respectively Mr. Anthony 
Raby-Hieatt and M. Philippe Comte, the Registrar of the Court was M. Edmond 
Butéri, the Chief Surveyor M. Louis Page and the Registrar of Land Titles was 
M. Roger Desestre. The Condominium Treasurer was Mr. George S.S. Hill, 
the Condominium Postmaster Mr. Harold T. Richards, all of whom held their posts 
for many years (with the exception of the Judges). Mr. Stan Jones was Manager 
1  Edward Jacomb was an English lawyer who lived in Port Vila during the early years of the Condominium 
government. His description of Port Vila and surroundings is contained in a microfilm of his unpublished 
diary which he called ‘A Family Portrait’ and which is held in the University of London Senate House Library. 
Copies (Microfilm M 2338) are also held in the National Library of Australia and the State Library of New 
South Wales. The nine-volume diary spans the years 1899–1923 and his description of Port Vila is contained 
in Volume 2, Part 1, Chapter 4 titled ‘Vila, New Hebrides.’ The description was also published in Nabanga 
(the Newsletter of the British Friends of Vanuatu), 2008, issue 98, p. 14.
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of Burns Philp (BP) in Port Vila, M. R. Guichard (known as the ‘man in the white 
coat’) was Manager of Comptoirs Français des Nouvelles-Hébrides (CFNH), 
Port Vila and M. Pierre Bourgeois had already established Hébrida (in a building 
on the seaward side of rue Higginson, the main street of Port Vila, more or 
less opposite CFNH). M. Antoine Rossi, who was thought by many to resemble 
closely his fellow Corsican Napoleon Bonaparte, and his wife presided over the 
hotel of that name, then a very old wooden building.
The principal settler families on Efate were the (French) Colardeaus, the 
de Gaillandes, Ohlens, the Russets, and (British) Seagoes and Hamlyn-Harrises 
(the latter at Undine Bay). The former lawyer M. G. Gomichon des Granges ran 
a fine plantation from his attractive house at Bellevue.
Figure 2. British Paddock with Administration offices.
Source: Photograph by Michael Allen, November 1958.
There was, of course, no deep-water wharf in those days and incoming cargo 
was lightered from the BP steamer Malaita and various Messageries Maritimes 
vessels (of which the elderly Polynésie did the regular Sydney, Noumea, New 
Hebrides run) to the BP and CFNH wharves fronting rue Higginson (Figure 9). 
Port Vila had enjoyed a town electricity supply provided, as now, by Union 
Electrique Coloniale des Nouvelles-Hébrides (UNELCO) since 1939, and the 
mains water system had been completed in 1952 by the Condominium Public 
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Works Department. Port Vila had a telephone system, the telephone then being 
of the magneto type, which you would vigorously wind a few times with the 
handle on the top of the instrument to alert the Exchange, then staffed by 
Mesdames Benebig and Bouvier and a number of New Hebrideans.
Figure 3. War Memorial, Port Vila, Iririki Island in background.
Source: Photograph by Michael Allen, November 1958.
It was all a far cry from the present-day Port Vila, and even from the one that I 
left in 1978. Most things had not changed much since the 1930s and there was 
not much to remind the casual observer that the US forces had garrisoned Port 
Vila from 1942 onwards, except the large numbers of ex-American Army lorries 
and jeeps, mainly owned by the planters. The Americans had constructed a fine 
airfield with a compacted coral runway at Bauerfield, but it was not in use in 
1953 as Qantas provided (until 1955) a fortnightly flying-boat service linking 
Port Vila with Santo, Noumea and Sydney. Although Qantas had given a year’s 
notice of its intention to cease operating the flying-boat by July 1955 because 
it was uneconomic, the improvements to Bauerfield required by the Australian 
Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) for Qantas to operate DC4s into it, had 
not been effected when the service was withdrawn. The French Government 
considered the DCA’s standards to be unnecessarily high. Somewhat more than a 
year later the French company T.A.I. began a service with DC3s to Port Vila and 
Santo from Tontouta, New Caledonia, and these aircraft were before long replaced 
by DC4s. Qantas, however, never resumed its air services to the New Hebrides.
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Figure 4. Roman Catholic cathedral, Port Vila.
Source: Photograph by Michael Allen, November 1958.
Figure 5. French Hospital lower-right side, Port Vila.
Source: Photograph by Michael Allen, November 1958.
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Figure 6. The Joint Court, Port Vila 1973—formerly the residence of the 
President of the Court.
Source: Photograph by Brian Bresnihan.
In 1953 Port Vila was still quite a small town. Although the Condominium had 
recently erected a number of new bungalows, both concrete and wooden, for its 
staff, and some new private houses had been built in the post-war period, the 
town had not much changed since the depression years of the 1930s. The main 
built-up area, bounded on the west by the sea-front road and on the east by the 
Colardeau plantation, extended from CFNH’s D Dock at the southern end of rue 
Higginson to the area known as Melcoffee (Coffee Mill), where the road leading 
from the French Hospital (Figure 5) and the main Condominium housing area met 
the coastal road. The great majority of dwellings were of wooden construction, 
many of them dating from the early years of the Condominium or before. Apart 
from those which were installed in the imposing Joint Court building2 (Survey 
and Lands Registry) (Figure 6) most of the other Condominium departmental 
offices were housed, in rather cramped conditions, on the ground floor of what 
was known as the Condominium building, said to have originally been a hotel. 
As the Condominium was chronically short of staff quarters, some of its bachelor 
2 This wooden building was originally the official residence of the President of the Joint Court but when 
this post was allowed to lapse in 1939, it became available for use as the Joint Court. Unfortunately, this 
imposing, historic structure was destroyed by fire on 6 June 2007, whether as a result of negligence or arson 
is not clear.
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officers had rooms on the upper floor. This dilapidated building did little credit 
to public services operated jointly by the world’s two greatest colonial powers! 
It was not to be replaced until the late 1960s by the modern building situated 
next to the BP store.
Great Britain and France, the two nations which had set up the joint 
administration of the New Hebrides in 1907, were represented in the territory 
by Resident Commissioners (RCs), who exercised their powers by delegation 
from the British and French High Commissioners. In 1953 the residencies 
were run on pretty much a shoe-string or minimalist basis. The BRC and his 
small staff of five or six expatriate officers, together with a mixed European 
and Melanesian clerical staff, occupied an impressive-looking wooden building 
situated at the top of the British Paddock (now Independence Park) (Figure 2). 
This structure, built in 1910, was known as the BR or the British Office. The BRC 
lived, however, in the BR house on Iririki. In 1953 he was still taken from the 
island to the Customs jetty on the mainland in a rowing boat manned by two 
or more Melanesians, known as the ‘boat boys’, who wore the sailor’s uniform 
traditional to British matelots. The British District Agent for Central District 
No. 1 (CD1), who was then also British Commandant of Police, had an office in 
the Police/Prison compound a little way across the Paddock.
There appears to have been a gentleman’s agreement between the British and 
French Residencies, dating presumably from the early years of the Condominium, 
that the two national flags would be flown at the same level. Not having been 
told of this, I was somewhat surprised when—probably in 1954—M. Jean-
Marie Jouve, the Chancelier (the No. 2 to the FRC) at the FR, telephoned to 
enquire whether we in the BR would have any objection to the Tricouleur being 
flown from a pole situated on higher ground than the Union flag. He explained 
that this was a consequence of the FR having been re-sited on land higher up 
the town—in 1952 as mentioned earlier. Despite my very junior position, and 
without even thinking of consulting my superiors, I answered that of course 
we didn’t mind. The new FR in fact directly overlooked the British compound, 
and enjoyed a spectacular view of the harbour, Iririki, Fila Island and the two 
headlands of Pango and Devil’s Point.
It seems that up to that point, the official French flagpole had remained at the site 
of the old Residency, which was very close to the War Memorial (Figure 3) and 
the old Joint Court. It was on this site that the French Administration erected a 
new secretariat building in the early 1960s. This building is now occupied by 
the Prime Minister and various departmental offices. Prior to its construction, 
the Chancelier and other French officials had worked in premises separate from 
the FR building in which the FRC had his private office or cabinet, as well as his 
living quarters.
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Before transferring in 1952 to the new Residency, the FRC and his personal 
secretariat had occupied an old wooden structure which stood on the site where 
the building, now used by the Prime Minister and other Vanuatu Government 
ministers, was erected in the mid-1960s as a new FR-combined Secretariat. In the 
intervening period the old FR, built at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
was used as a school. The new Residency, into which the FRC had moved by 
1953, stood on high ground overlooking the British Paddock and affording 
a splendid view of the harbour and Devil’s Point beyond. The Chancelier, 
or counterpart to the British Assistant RC, and the remainder of the French 
Secretariat occupied an elderly building behind the old Joint Court. The latter, 
which was demolished in the early 1970s, had stood on a site immediately above 
the War Memorial. The staff of the FR was comparable in size to that of the BR. 
The FR, however, filled its clerical posts with European women, owing to the 
lack, at that period, of suitably educated Melanesians, together with the need 
to provide employment for locally domiciled Frenchwomen, as was explained to 
me by a high-ranking French official, M. L’Inspecteur Sanner, who visited Port 
Vila in 1954.
No cruise ships visited the New Hebrides in the 1950s, and there was virtually 
no tourism. The economy of the Condominium was overwhelmingly based on the 
export of copra with Melanesian production soon to match, and later overtake, 
that from European (mainly French) plantations. The world copra price was 
very high in the early 1950s, owing to the Korean War, and the New Hebrides 
was enjoying a period of prosperity. In 1952, one planter on Efate was said to 
have made £20,000 Australian, then a huge sum. Melanesians too benefited from 
the good copra price, and from high wages on the plantations. By 1953, exports 
of the more labour-intensive cash crops cacao and coffee, which, together with 
cotton, had once been important, had shrunk to a few hundred tons. The starting 
of the tuna fishing industry, based at Palekula, Santo was still four years into 
the future (1957), but the local entrepreneur, Mr. Donald J. Gubbay, was already 
making plans for it, in conjunction with a Japanese company. In 1953, however, 
commerce in the New Hebrides, especially the buying and exporting of copra 
and the selling of imported merchandise throughout the islands, was dominated 
by the long-established Australian firm of BP of Sydney, and CFNH owned by 
the Ballandes of Bordeaux and Nouméa. Chinese shopkeepers in Luganville, 
Santo, as well as in Port Vila, had an important part of the local retail trade, and 
were much patronised by Melanesians, perhaps because, so I heard, they had to 
wait while Europeans were served first in European stores.
A Political Memoir of the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides
8
Figure 7. Burns Philp’s pier and Iririki Island on right.
Source: Photograph by Michael Allen, November 1958.
In the 1950s, there were still no locally operated air services in the Condominion. 
Moreover, the withdrawal by Qantas in July 1955 of its flying boat service from 
Sydney and Noumea meant that the New Hebrides had no air link with the 
outside world until the French airline, TAI, instituted a service between Port 
Vila, Santo and Noumea in 1956. During that period, communication between 
the islands depended entirely on local shipping, with both BP and Ballandes 
operating inter-island trading vessels together with a few local businessmen 
(Figure 7). In January 1956, I had the pleasure of a leisurely voyage from Santo 
to Port Vila on BP’s trading schooner, Moala, much of it under sail when the 
wind was favourable; a delightful Fijian seaman, the late Osea Tunidau, was in 
command, with a Melanesian crew. I had travelled to Santo on the new BP ship, 
the MV Tulagi, which had just come on to the Sydney, New Hebrides and New 
Guinea line.
In 1953, we had no accurate figure for the population of the New Hebrides, but 
it is a fairly safe guess that it was about 60,000, since it had reached some 78,000 
by the time of the 1967 census. The overwhelming majority was Melanesian 
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with up to 1,500, mainly French, European, rather more than 2,000 Vietnamese 
(known then as Tonkinese) and a few hundred Chinese.3 There were also some 
dozens of Wallis Island plantation workers.
Figure 8. Keith Woodward and unidentified friend at one of Port Vila’s 
nearby beaches.
Source: Photograph by Michael Allen, November 1958.
Members of the predominantly French European community on Santo rather 
resented being governed from Port Vila and were apt to point out that much 
more copra was either produced on, or exported through, Santo from other 
northern islands than was handled in Port Vila. This fact was recognised by 
the Condominium authorities when Santo was given priority over Port Vila for 
the construction of a deep-water wharf (completed in 1958), the largest civil 
3  In the early 1920s the French Government had arranged for Vietnamese to be brought to the New 
Hebrides to relieve the chronic shortage of labour on French-owned plantations. By 1953, however, most of 
the Tonkinese (as they were then usually called, from the province of Indo-China where they had originated) 
had left the plantations, and had become artisans, taxi-drivers, barbers, market-gardeners or domestic 
servants. They were technically en instance de rapatriment (awaiting repatriation) to their homeland, but the 
Vietminh insurgency in French Indo-China, which led in 1954 to North Vietnam becoming an independent 
state, resulted in their return being delayed. It was not until 1963 that the majority of the Tonkinese left 
the New Hebrides. Whilst the older ones among them wanted to go back to Vietnam, many, or most of the 
Vietnamese who had been born in the Condominium went reluctantly, and in some cases hid themselves to 
avoid being taken to a country to which they felt no attachment. Some 300 Vietnamese were able to remain 
in the New Hebrides.
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engineering project so far financed by the Joint Administration. I had been 
told that the settlement situated on the northern side of the Segond Channel 
(often referred to as ‘the canal’ in those days) was very different, both physically 
and in its whole atmosphere, from Port Vila. I was immediately struck, visiting 
Luganville for the first time in December 1954, by this difference. Whereas Port 
Vila, apart from being much larger, was a compact town, Luganville (the name 
was, however, not much used in Port Vila then) was strung along a few miles 
of the south coast of Santo, beginning in the west with the French District 
Agency, the French Hospital and the Catholic Mission. Going eastwards, one 
came to the Condominium Radio Station, and further on, BP’s main store. It 
was, however, on the east side of the Sarakata River that the main commercial 
area was to be found—Chinese stores (Fung Kwan Chee’s, Ah Yuen’s and Johnny 
Lum’s), Desplat’s Garage, the Hotel Corsica, various bars, the cinema and 
CFNH—I forget in which order. The main street (also named rue Higginson) 
was quite wide—a relic of the US wartime presence, as were all the roads in 
the area, and the numerous Quonset huts. There was, some people said, a ‘wild 
west’ atmosphere about the place, and that was my impression. It was certainly 
reminiscent of some small American mid-West towns, and one would not have 
been surprised to see a cowboy hitch his horse to a tethering-rail outside one of 
the bars. The British District Agency was then still situated on the small island 
of Venue, off the south-west coast, but the District Agent had a town office and 
sleeping accommodation in the ex-US Navy PT Base, on the Sarakata River. 
The Condominium Customs and Survey Departments may also have had offices 
in the Base buildings.
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Figure 9. The Polynésie, from the Rossi Hotel, Port Vila waterfront.
Source: Photograph by Michael Allen, November 1958.
When I arrived in the New Hebrides in 1953 nothing was happening regarding 
its political future, nor did it seem likely that anything would, at least not in the 
foreseeable future. The Anglo-French Condominium system of government had 
been in existence for a little over forty-five years and, as far as anyone could see, 
looked set to go on indefinitely. Some visitors, especially Australian journalists, 
were inclined to laugh at the Condominium with its two police forces wearing 
quaint and quite different uniforms, and called it the Pandemonium. However, 
no one was talking publicly about changing it. In the years immediately 
following the Great War of 1914–18, the British and French Governments had 
looked at possible alternatives to the continuation of the Condominium, such as 
partition of the group between the two Powers, or one of them making way for 
the other, to be compensated, perhaps by an African colony. Given the serious 
difficulties involved in the adoption of either of these options, it was found 
much easier to continue with the status quo, and in 1922, the Anglo-French 
Protocol of 6 August 1914, which had been suspended because of the outbreak 
of war with Germany, had duly been brought into force.
There was, moreover, no agitation for change in the New Hebrides in 1953, either 
among the small European communities, or the Melanesian population. The copra 
price was still high, and Melanesians could earn good wages. The abuses that had 
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attended their employment on plantations in the early years of the Condominium 
were a thing of the past, and many planters had standing arrangements with 
particular villages for the supply of labour. No major hurricane or earthquake 
had hit Port Vila for many years, and in the group as a whole the most serious 
recent natural disaster had been a combination of earthquake and hurricane 
damage on Ambrym in 1950–51, which resulted in the re-settlement on French-
owned land near Mele village, Efate, of people from Maat on Ambrym. Their 
new village was usually known as Mele-Maat, or just Maat.
At this period, there had been no extensive migration to Port Vila of people 
from the outer islands, although there were some small groups from the islands 
living in the peri-urban area as, for example, people from Pentecost at Tebakor, 
just north of Port Vila, who had their own Anglican church on land owned 
by a Fila Island family. Some years later, I was to be much involved in helping 
these people re-locate to the Anglican Church land at Tagabe. This was bought 
from Harry Ohlen at the very reasonable price of one shilling and three pence 
Australian a square metre (AU12.5 cents). That was in 1959, long before the era 
of land speculation.
Relations between the British and French Residencies, both at work and 
socially, were good when I arrived in Port Vila. At that particular time, there 
were no matters at issue that involved any significant divergence in policy 
between the two sides of the Condominium. The FRC, Pierre Anthonioz, who 
had had a remarkable military career with the Free French during World War 
II, was very sociable, and the officers of the BR and their wives enjoyed much 
lavish hospitality at the FR, where the champagne flowed. Anthonioz was a 
good swimmer, despite having a crippled right arm, the result of a war wound, 
and not long before my arrival had swum between Pango and Devil’s Point, a 
distance of approximately 6.2 miles (10 kilometres). At this time, the staff of the 
two Residencies were quite small, and this fact gave rise to more social contacts 
between them than I recall from later years, when both staffs were much larger, 
and socially more self-sufficient.
Relations with New Hebrideans
Although there was no explicit colour bar directed against Melanesians, it could 
not be said that Europeans and Melanesians lived on an equal footing in the 
1950s. One did not, for example, expect to find Melanesians drinking or dining 
in the Hotel Rossi. There was virtually no social contact in Port Vila between 
Europeans and Melanesians, although the chiefs of the villages around the town 
were invited to the large receptions given by the two Residencies on occasions 
such as the Queen’s Birthday, the 14th July, and the visits of High Commissioners 
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or other important persons. I was often addressed as Masta when encountering 
a Melanesian. The planters, and many other people, usually referred to male 
Melanesian labourers as ‘boys’. The living quarters provided by BP for their 
labour were a disgrace. It is not without a sense of shame, moreover, that I 
remember the sub-standard housing provided by the BR for its Melanesian 
clerical staff—all corrugated iron huts with no modern toilet or washing 
facilities, minimal furniture, and, of course, no refrigerators or proper cookers 
(which, in any case, their low salaries would not have enabled them to use; the 
cost of electricity, kerosene and white spirit being very high).
In the 1950s, the legal status of the indigenous New Hebrideans (I shall use this 
term henceforth, though it should be noted that since 1980 indigenous New 
Hebrideans have been known as ni-Vanuatu) was not a matter of discontent 
on their part. When in the following decade, New Hebrideans began to travel 
beyond the south-west Pacific, their lack of a proper passport sometimes caused 
difficulties, as immigration officials were not familiar with the unimpressive 
identity card, bearing the signatures of both Resident Commissioners, carried 
by New Hebrideans. The statelessness of New Hebrideans became an issue in the 
Advisory Council (AdCo), and the Resident Commissioners promised to provide 
New Hebrideans with a travel document which looked like a normal passport. 
The Resident Commissioners were powerless to do more, as New Hebrideans 
could not be citizens of a state which did not exist, or of a colonial territory that 
was not a legal entity.
In my view, the only inequality suffered by New Hebrideans from a judicial 
system otherwise fair to them was the failure of the Protocol to provide for New 
Hebrideans to sit as Assessors on the Joint Court and the Courts of First Instance 
(the latter dealt with offences against Joint Regulations) when New Hebrideans 
appeared before these courts. I was instrumental in getting this defect remedied, 
but only a few years before Independence. In general, I found the sentencing in 
all the courts, and especially the Joint Court, to be light.
I suppose the most charitable term that one can apply to the attitude of most 
Europeans, and of Government, towards the indigenous people of the group 
is paternalism. The inequalities of status which went with paternalism are 
perhaps best illustrated by the fact that, among the various races inhabiting 
the New Hebrides, the Melanesians were legally prohibited from consuming 
alcohol by the Protocol of 1914. This prohibition, which doubtless owed much 
to mission influence, was intended for the good of the people subjected to 
it. Unfortunately, however, it could not be thoroughly enforced. Many New 
Hebrideans succeeded in obtaining liquor, as plantation owners found it easier 
to obtain labour if they supplied it. There were, moreover, not a few traders 
operating in the outer islands, who could make good profits from flouting the 
prohibitions on the sale of liquor to New Hebrideans, and hardly any were ever 
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prosecuted. Nor was prohibition strictly enforced on New Hebrideans, unless 
they were discovered by the police, drunk and incapable or disorderly, in a 
public place. This meant in practice that New Hebrideans were only prosecuted 
in Port Vila and Luganville, since there was virtually no police presence in the 
rural areas. In the two towns, however, the District Agents displayed a certain 
amount of energy, especially on Saturday evenings, in looking for drunks. Apart 
from the desirability of letting the hapless offenders sober up out of harm’s 
way in the kalabus (prison),4 a good round up of drunks at the weekend would 
ensure the availability of labour for grass-cutting during the following week. 
The sentence usually handed down by the courts for ordinary cases of public 
inebriety was one week inside.
The liquor prohibition could give rise to social embarrassment. If I was 
attending, say a Queen’s Birthday reception at the BR, and talking to one of 
the chiefs, or a New Hebridean medical officer, I felt uneasy to be holding a 
glass of beer, whilst he could have only lemonade. It has to be acknowledged, 
however, that New Hebridean guests often left these functions somewhat under 
the weather, as the Residency bar-tenders, themselves Melanesians, connived at 
discreet infringement of the liquor law! Who could blame them? The BRC did 
not worry unduly, provided no one got obviously and embarrassingly tipsy. 
Prohibition was relaxed in 1962, when it was agreed by the Advisory Council 
that New Hebrideans should be allowed to buy beer and wine, but not drink 
in bars. The ban on their consumption of spirits was not lifted, however, until 
1974 (at the last but one session of AdCo).
Domestic and public architecture
Although I had got married in London on 7 March 1953, I arrived in Port Vila 
alone, as my wife, Joyce, had to work out her three months’ notice before 
leaving her secretarial post at St. Mary’s Hospital, Paddington to join me. So I 
was billeted with my old Oxford friend Michael Challons and his Swedish wife 
Barbara, who then occupied BR house No. 3. This large wooden bungalow had 
been built (with two others of the same design) in 1909. Edward Jacomb had 
been the first occupant of it. House No. 3 stood outside the British Paddock, on 
a beautiful site, with large shade trees in a long garden that ended at the top of 
the cliff overlooking the Condominium workshops (their site is now occupied by 
the Government office building) and the BP store. The old Presbyterian Church 
(destroyed completely in the 1959 hurricane) was situated immediately opposite 
the house, just a few yards from our front entrance. This fine old house, so 
suitable for tropical living, which had withstood the hurricane, was demolished 
4  Kalabus is the Bislama word for a prison and in common use in the New Hebrides and now Vanuatu.
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in the late 1960s, when the site was transferred to Condominium ownership for 
the construction of a concrete house for a head of department. When I re-visited 
Port Vila with my second wife Elizabeth in 1988 we were guests for dinner there 
of Home Affairs Minister, Sethy Regenvanu and his wife, Dorothy.
When I walked up the middle road of the British Paddock on 27 March 1953 
to begin work at the British office, the landscape was very different from the 
present-day one. There were fewer houses to be seen, many more coconut 
palms, as well as three large shade trees, which stood on the northern side of 
the Paddock, in front of the house now occupied by the Prime Minister. There 
was long grass on this side of the Paddock and this provided grazing for the 
small herd of horses which then roamed around in it. My old bungalow, which 
was also located in this area of the Paddock, has long been replaced by the 
Melanesian Spearhead headquarters building.5 Across the cricket field on the 
other side could be seen the building of the British Police and the British Prison.
Standing in relative isolation southward of the cricket field was a wooden 
building, the British School. This one-classroom establishment took the children 
of BR staff, including New Hebrideans, and also of British and Australian people 
in the commercial sector, the Condominium and the Presbyterian Mission, at 
junior primary level. In 1953, the teacher in charge was Mrs. Ruth Peebles, the 
wife of one of my colleagues. A few years later, this school was demolished, and 
replaced by a larger one, in the building which now houses the offices of the 
Ministry of Education. The cost of running the Paddock School and a subsidy 
of £200 per annum to the Presbyterian Mission’s Iririki District School (situated, 
despite its name, on the road to Pango Point), constituted the totality of the 
British Government expenditure on education in those days.
Constitutional advance?
In 1953, the New Hebrides may have been almost alone among British and 
French colonial territories in not having any kind of representative institution. 
There was, however, no political pressure from within the Anglo-French 
Condominium for the establishment of some kind of representative body. There 
was no agitation for constitutional advance, and the population at large seemed 
content with their unique form of administration by two nations. No doubt 
people would have liked to see more infrastructural and social development, 
such as more and better roads, schools and health services. On the other hand, 
taxation was light (there was no income or corporation tax) and the Government 
5  The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) is a governmental organisation consisting of the four Melanesian 
states of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the Kanak and Socialist National Liberation 
Front of New Caledonia. It was founded as a political organisation in 1983.
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did not impinge much on the everyday lives of the Condominium’s inhabitants. 
This was particularly true of the great majority of the Melanesian population 
living in the rural areas. Unless they committed more than minor crimes, or 
engaged in some kind of activity that the RCs deemed subversive, most New 
Hebridean villagers could simply ignore the Gavman (Bislama for Government).
Having just alluded to subversive activity, it is convenient to digress briefly 
from the question of constitutional advance, or lack of it, in order to mention 
the John Frum movement. This movement, a kind of millenarian ‘cult’, started 
up on Tanna in the early 1940s. In 1953, its principal leaders were either still 
in prison or exiled from Tanna, or recently had been. At this stage, the Joint 
Administration was pursuing a policy of repression towards this movement. 
This was, however, to change after 1957, to be replaced by toleration, on the 
understanding impressed on Nakomaha (a leader of the movement) and his 
fellow John Frum bosses by the RCs in person that they did not impinge upon 
the lives of non-cult villages.6
My personal contact with John Frum was virtually nil. I did visit Ipekel with 
the then British District Agent, Southern District, Michael Challons, in May 
1957, but our brief conversation with Mwailes and other John Frum notables 
unsurprisingly gave us no indication that they were planning to march around 
Tanna, the episode which caused such concern some weeks later. I thought their 
demeanour towards Challons at this encounter was, although not actually hostile, 
one of indifference, and far removed from the usual courteous friendliness 
experienced by district agents when visiting New Hebridean villages. Challons 
had a very good way with New Hebrideans and made himself very popular 
during his three years or so on Tanna.
The absence in the New Hebrides of any representative body should be viewed 
in a world-wide and, especially, in a Pacific context. Though France and Great 
Britain had endorsed the principle of self-determination in the Atlantic Charter 
in 1941 they still had large colonial empires, and with very few exceptions, 
none was on the point of gaining independence. This was particularly true in 
the South Pacific. The British Solomon Islands had only a nominated Advisory 
Council, and the Gilbert (Kiribati) and Ellice Islands Colony (Tuvalu) had 
not even this modest form of representation. The French territories of New 
Caledonia and French Polynesia had elected assemblies, but the executive 
powers were firmly in the hands of their governors. In the New Hebrides at this 
6  Soon after the release of Nakomaha from prison very early in 1957, the men of the principal John Frum 
village of Ipekel, Sulphur Bay, began drilling with wooden muskets. When, a few months later they began 
marching into non-John Frum districts, adopting a somewhat menacing posture, both RCs visited Ipekel with 
a joint police detachment, collected up the wooden muskets, and made it clear that such activities would not 
be countenanced. Marching outside Sulphur Bay was, in fact, never resumed and nor were any John Frum 
leaders imprisoned.
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time, the indigenous people were in no way politicised, and there was, as yet, no 
sign of awakening political awareness. Only a very small number had received 
any kind of secondary education and, importantly, there were no Melanesian 
university graduates. People did not read newspapers, and the era of generalised 
ownership of transistor radios had not yet arrived. The preoccupations of rural 
New Hebrideans were not what was going on in the outside world, but with 
their churches, the state of their subsistence gardens and the price of copra.
In 1953, despite the absence of any pressure in the New Hebrides for constitutional 
advance, the important people concerned with such matters must have decided 
that something should be done to initiate progress, even if only slowly and 
modestly. Given my own very junior position in the BR, I was, of course, quite 
unaware of what was brewing until late in that year, or the beginning of 1954, 
so I do not know whether the opening move for ‘doing something about the 
New Hebrides’ came from London or Paris.
A conference to consider the future of the New Hebrides was held in Honiara, 
the capital of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, in March 1954. It 
was attended by the British High Commissioner for the western Pacific, Sir 
Robert Stanley, by his French counterpart, M. Angamarre, by the BRC, Mr. 
(later Sir) Hubert Flaxman and by his French colleague, M. Pierre Anthonioz. 
A high-ranking official from Paris, M. L’Inspecteur Sanner, was also present. 
I do not remember whether the British Colonial Office was represented at the 
meeting, but I think not. This conference was important in the history of the 
Condominium because it showed that the British and French Governments, long 
content to let the New Hebrides be a colonial backwater, where no progress 
took place, realised that the time had come for change. The need to promote 
economic development was recognised, and the decision to build the deep-
water wharf at Santo was almost certainly taken at this conference together with 
some minor administrative changes concerning Condominium public services. 
The major decisions, however, and the only ones that concern us here, were 
of a constitutional nature. The High Commissioners decided to recommend to 
their respective Governments the setting up of an Advisory Council, and of an 
embryonic system of local government, both of which were to involve a degree 
of popular representation in the conduct of public affairs.
The Advisory Council—AdCo
It was not until 1957 that a Joint Regulation was made to establish a temporary 
Advisory Council for the New Hebrides (JRs were the form of legislation used 
in the Condominium and were usually signed by the two RCs). Most unusually, 
it was signed by the British and French High Commissioners, and I was present 
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in the BRC’s office when Sir John Gutch, who had succeeded Stanley as High 
Commissioner in 1955, signed the English and French texts (all Condominium 
legislation was, of course, issued in both languages). The JR provided for 
an Advisory Council composed of four British, four French and four New 
Hebridean unofficial private members, together with two official members and 
the RCs, who were to be the joint Presidents. The two official members were 
always the Condominium Treasurer and the Superintendent of Public Works, 
these posts being held, invariably by a British and French official respectively. 
The Council, usually known as AdCo, had no legislative power and its function 
was to advise the RCs on the matters (which had to include the Condominium 
budget) referred to it. Although, in practice, the RCs consulted AdCo on most 
important matters, it was not always possible to do so as the Council only met, 
primarily to examine the proposed Condominium budget, once a year for the 
first few years after its inception in 1958. Exceptionally, however, there were 
two sessions in 1958—an inaugural one at the beginning of the year, and the 
Budget Session at the end of it.
The first few sessions of AdCo were held in the audience chamber of the old 
Joint Court, but its meetings took place in the Port Vila Cultural Centre after 
completion of the Centre in 1960 or 1961. In the early days of AdCo we did not 
have simultaneous interpretation facilities, which were acquired only after the 
Council began meeting in the long hall of the Cultural Centre, where there was 
enough space for the installation of the interpreters’ booths. While the AdCo 
sessions were still held in the old Joint Court, proceedings were considerably 
slowed down by consecutive interpretation, with M. Louis Page (the Chief 
Surveyor) and a bilingual officer from the BR translating each speech, sentence 
by sentence after the person speaking, into French or English. In addition, 
as some of the New Hebridean members did not understand either of these 
languages, translation into Bislama also had to be provided, usually by M. 
Raymond Colardeau (a younger brother of the planter, M. Andre Colardeau). 
I attended all the AdCo sittings in the capacity of Secretary, in order to take 
summarised notes of the speeches, as we did not then make a verbatim record 
of the debates (that was begun when we had simultaneous interpretation). After 
being put into shape by dictation to my secretary, and approved by my French 
colleague, my summary of the proceedings became the official record, and was 
in due course distributed to AdCo members. I very much wish that I had kept 
copies of these early AdCo minutes, as I fear it would now be difficult, if not 
impossible, to locate any of them in Vanuatu.
Up until 1964, the members of AdCo were appointed jointly by the RCs, with each 
RC nominating, for his colleague’s agreement, the members of his own nationality 
and half of the New Hebridean ones. It was the unwritten convention that the 
RCs accepted each other’s nominations without demur. Among the earliest 
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British AdCo members, as far as I can recall, were R.U. Paul of Tanna; G. Wilson, 
Manager of BP, Port Vila; the Reverend R.W. Murray, Presbyterian missionary 
from Nguna; and Keith Solway, a Santo planter. The French members were 
Monseigneur Julliard, the Catholic Bishop; R. Guichard, Manager of CFNH, Port 
Vila; H. Ohlen, planter, Efate; and Jean My, planter, Santo. The New Hebrideans 
were Dr. John Kalsakau, Fila Island; John Qarani, Vanua Lava; Thomas Noal, 
Port Resolution, Tanna; Chief Jack of Pinalum, Malekula; and Chief Toma Avusa 
later named Tom Tiploamata of Tongoa. None of these was francophone, as it 
was very difficult in those days for the FR to find French-speaking Melanesians 
of a status appropriate for AdCo membership. Ex-President of Vanuatu, Jean-
Marie Leyhe, was, I think, the first francophone AdCo member.
The RCs also appointed an alternate member for each full AdCo member. 
Alternate members took the place of full members when they were unable to 
attend sessions of the Council. Mr. Ken Hutton, then resident at Luganville, 
was Keith Solway’s alternate, and he attended far more meetings of AdCo than 
Solway, who seemed little interested in making any contribution to the Council’s 
work. I think we gained by the exchange, as Hutton took an active and useful 
part in the proceedings.
When writing of the first meeting of AdCo, I was reminded of a tragic incident 
that occurred in 1952 on a plantation in the Big Bay area of Santo. A French 
plantation manager called Chavreau shot dead two men from the Santo Bush, 
who were working on the plantation, because—he alleged—one of them 
struck, or threatened him. Chavreau was given a suspended sentence of one 
year’s imprisonment. The double killing aroused intense resentment among the 
bush people, who withdrew their labour from European plantations for some 
years. As part of the measures recommended by the French anthropologist, Jean 
Guiart (Figure 11), to restore confidence among the bush villagers, one of their 
leading big men, Mol Valivu, was brought down to Port Vila to sit in on the 
inaugural session of AdCo. Other measures taken by the FR at Guiart’s suggestion 
included the setting up of a school and a co-operative for Mol Valivu’s people at 
Ipayato, south-west Santo. These various remedial measures had a good effect, 
and I recall being escorted by Mol Valivu for part of our walk into the Santo 
high country in May 1958, when I was a member of a small party of officials 
investigating a disputed prospecting licence claim, involving Mr. D.J. Gubbay 
and the French mining company, CFPO. We settled the dispute amicably.
In 1959, the New Hebridean membership of AdCo was increased from four to 
eight. Thus was instituted the principle, not to be abandoned until 1974, of 
parity of membership between New Hebridean native and non-native members. 
Although this parity was obviously incompatible with the enormous disparity 
between the Melanesian and non-native populations, it was considered at 
the time that the contribution made by the small European community to the 
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economy was some justification for its disproportionate representation on AdCo. 
The disparity was apparently accepted with good grace by the New Hebridean 
AdCo members, and the early sessions were quiet affairs. At this stage, the 
European members did most of the talking, their interventions being mainly 
concerned with various Heads of the Budget as they related to their own local 
concerns.
The road to self-government
By 1963, we in the BR were thinking that it was time to take a further step, even if 
only a small one, along the road which would ultimately lead the New Hebrides 
to self-government. It was, I suppose, natural that we should take account of 
what was going on in the Solomon Islands, a neighbouring British territory, 
which was also peopled by Melanesians, and was at a stage of development 
comparable to that of the New Hebrides. In 1960, or soon afterwards, the 
Solomons, which had had an AdCo since 1928, had been given a Legislative 
Council (known as LegCo for short). It should not be thought, however, that the 
establishment of LegCo marked a momentous degree of constitutional advance. 
The Council contained only four private members, two European and two 
Solomon Islanders, all appointed by the High Commissioner, who presided at 
its sittings. There were also five official members, who held the most senior 
posts in the Government. Since these constituted a majority of the Council, 
the Government was always sure of getting its legislation passed, even if all the 
private members opposed it. In 1963, the BRC sent me to Honiara for a few days, 
so that I could sit in on a session of LegCo, to see how it functioned.
The private members of LegCo were then the Anglican Bishop of Melanesia, the 
Right Reverend Alfred Hill; a European businessman called Lawson; Anglican 
Assistant Bishop Leonard Alufarai (of Malaita); and Methodist Minister, Wesley 
Cary, also a Solomon Islander. From my point of view, the most interesting thing 
that occurred while I attended the sittings happened when the four private 
members tabled a motion proposing that there should be a member of LegCo 
elected by universal suffrage to represent Honiara. The four members duly 
spoke in support of their motion, but it was not acceptable to the Government. 
I thought the High Commissioner, Sir David Trench, displayed a certain lack 
of regard for due parliamentary procedure, to say nothing of tact, when after 
the four private members had voted for the motion, he did not bother to ask 
the officials to vote, but simply announced from the Chair that their motion 
was lost! I was Bishop Hill’s guest for dinner that evening, and he and Bishop 
Leonard were in a very anti-Administration mood, because of the cavalier way 
in which their motion had been treated. I shared their feelings and said so.
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My attendance at the session of the Solomons LegCo had been an instructive 
and useful experience. I returned to Port Vila convinced that we in the New 
Hebrides should not, on our way to ultimate self-government, go through 
the stage of a legislature with an official majority, which I felt to be (from a 
democratic viewpoint) valueless. In reality, the private members of the Honiara 
LegCo had no more power than had the members of the preceding AdCo. Their 
views could be over-ruled whenever the High Commissioner chose to bring the 
big guns of his official majority to bear on them. Moreover, I thought our French 
colleagues were too logical to see any point in such a contrived constitutional 
device, to say nothing of the people of the New Hebrides.
Although, at this time—the early 1960s—there was no popular pressure on 
the New Hebrides Joint Administration for further constitutional advance, I 
believed that only a few years would elapse before we faced demands for such 
advance, as progress in the education of New Hebrideans brought an educated 
élite into being. I was also aware that there were those among the European 
community, who thought they should have some influence on the conduct of 
public affairs. In settling out my ideas on the subject to the RC (then Mr. A.M. 
Wilkie, CMG) and Mr. (later Sir) Michael Gass, then Chief Secretary to the 
Western Pacific High Commission, I stressed the desirability of keeping ahead 
of political pressure by bringing in the next stage of constitutional advance, 
without waiting for popular demand to build up. I said that if we pursued this 
policy we would be better able to manage progress towards self-government 
at a pace commensurate with the readiness of the people for it. In this way, 
the Joint Administration might perhaps avoid being hustled precipitately into 
an advanced state of self-government for the territory, without having prepared 
the way for it by passing through a gradual process of evolution. In the event, 
of course, what I hoped to avoid was what happened, as a result of the French 
Government being unwilling to move the Condominium beyond the AdCo 
stage, as we shall see, until 1975, by which time the National Party (NP) was 
clamouring for independence.
To return to 1964—I was then authorised, in my capacity as a kind of political 
adviser, to approach the FR at Chancelier level, in order to ascertain our 
colleagues’ views on some further constitutional advance. The FRC at that 
time was M. Maurice Delauney (1961–64) who, after a varied career, died in 
December 2009 at the age of ninety. The Chancelier was M. Robert Langlois. 
Perhaps inspired by the motion of the private members of the Solomons LegCo 
in 1963, I suggested to Langlois that some members of AdCo should be elected 
by universal suffrage to represent Port Vila and Luganville. Langlois gave me a 
courteous and attentive hearing and said the FR would consider that suggestion. 
Nothing came of it, however, and I am now rather doubtful as to the validity of 
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singling out one or both towns for an advanced dose of democracy. The main 
argument for so doing was that it would have been fairly easy to organise direct 
elections in the urban areas, as compared with the islands.
In the meantime, things had moved on in the Solomons, where LegCo was 
to have a number of members elected by the Local Councils that covered the 
whole of the Protectorate. This seemed an arrangement that could be extended 
to the New Hebrides. We therefore proposed to the FR that the number of 
AdCo private members should be increased from sixteen to twenty (ten New 
Hebrideans and ten expatriates), and that four members in each category 
should be indirectly elected.
Beginning in 1957 some Local Councils, which exercised authority only over 
Melanesians, had been set up. It appeared to me feasible that representatives of 
Local Councils should meet together in each of the four Districts, and should 
elect a member of AdCo. This would be a modest step forward. Given the small 
size of the non-native population, it would have been fairly easy for it to elect 
four AdCo members by direct suffrage, but this would have been invidious, as 
it would have accorded a greater degree of democracy to the non-natives than 
to the New Hebrideans. The Chamber of Commerce provided the solution to 
our problems.
The New Hebrides Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, established 
by Joint Regulation in 1963, had an electoral college composed mainly, or entirely, 
of non-natives, principally Europeans. However, half of the actual members 
of the Chamber were appointed by the RCs, and these included a number of 
New Hebrideans, such as André Carlot of Erakor, to ensure that the commercial 
interests of Melanesians were not overlooked. It seemed to me in 1964 that the 
Chamber of Commerce Electoral College of some 230 persons would be a suitable 
body of people for the purpose of electing four non-native AdCo Members.7 
This device for the choice of non-native members would, I thought, constitute 
an unobjectionable counterpart to the Local Council electoral colleges proposed 
for getting four New Hebrideans indirectly elected to AdCo.
The BRC, Mr. A.M. Wilkie, approved my proposals, and these were submitted 
to the FR, which accepted them quite happily. The second AdCo set up in 1964 
had twenty-six members, six more than the 1959 body. It was composed of 
twenty private members, eight of whom were indirectly elected, the two RCs, 
Joint Presidents, two Condominium Heads of Department, and (an innovation) 
the British Assistant RC, then Mr. (later Sir) Colin Allan,8 and the Chancelier of 
the FR, M. Robert Langlois.
7  Persons holding a trading licence were eligible for inclusion in the Chamber of Commerce Electoral College.
8  Later, upon Mr. Wilkie’s death in 1966, Allan became BRC. Leaving the New Hebrides in 1973, he became 
the last Governor of the Seychelles, and then the last Governor of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, 
which gained its independence in 1978. He died in Auckland in 1993.
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The enlarged, and partly-elected AdCo, which began its life in 1964, remained 
a purely advisory body. However, the RCs sought to counteract the Council’s 
lack of formal deliberative powers by submitting all important proposals for 
legislation, and other weighty matters, such as the Joint Development Plan, 
to it for consideration. To this end, the Council was usually convened for a 
mid-year session, in addition to the end of year budget meeting. Moreover, if 
proposed Joint Regulations or other matters were deemed sufficiently urgent 
to make it undesirable to defer them until the next AdCo full session, they 
would be referred to the Council’s Standing Committee, which, because it was 
much smaller, could be convened more quickly and at less expense. As I recall 
it, the Standing Committee was composed of eight private members (four New 
Hebrideans and four Europeans) and four of the six official members, including, 
of course, the two RCs as joint chairmen.
As the 1960s wore on members of AdCo, and more especially the New Hebridean 
and British ones, began to press for more rapid constitutional advance, while 
behind the scenes the British Government was seeking French agreement for the 
replacement of AdCo by a legislative body. These negotiations were, however, 
uphill work, as the French Government remained to be convinced that the New 
Hebrideans were yet ‘politically mature’ enough for such a change. From an 
objective viewpoint this may well have been true, since the New Hebridean 
people had enjoyed only a very brief and inadequate involvement in the conduct, 
at the national level, of public affairs. Experience in her colonial empire world-
wide had, however, taught Britain that once a colonised people began to think it 
had the right to run its own affairs, such feelings quickly gathered momentum, 
and could not long be held in check by recourse to objective criteria as to the 
readiness, or otherwise, of that people for self-government. Indeed, events in the 
New Hebrides during the 1970s bore witness yet again to this inescapable truth.
The FR got a shock when, on Joan of Arc Day, in June 1966, the recently 
ordained Roman Catholic priest, Fr. Gérard Leymang, in a sermon preached to 
a congregation which included the two RCs, alluded to the prospect of the New 
Hebrides one day becoming independent. Father Charles Verlingue subsequently 
called upon the BRC to apologise, on behalf of the Bishop (Monseigneur Julliard) 
for Gérard’s untimely gaffe. He was assured by Mr. Wilkie that no apology was 
necessary. Shortly afterwards, the erring cleric was sent off to the Catholic 
University at Lyon, France, to pursue a two-year course in social studies. Exile 
did not diminish Leymang’s interest in public affairs in the New Hebrides, and 
it fell to me to answer letters from him to the BR seeking information relevant 
to political development. There was, perhaps, some significance in his choosing 
to write to us, despite being a francophone. After Leymang’s return from Lyon 
the FR very sensibly made him a member of AdCo. In this capacity he was 
quite forthright in criticism of the Joint Administration and in pressing for 
constitutional advance. Leymang was an early member of the NP, but he found 
a more congenial political home in the Union des Communautés des Nouvelles-
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Hébrides (UCNH) later on. The NP (subsequently renamed the Vanuaku Party/
Vanu’aki Pati) might possibly have attracted other radical francophones had 
it not, by virtue of injudicious pronouncements at various times, conveyed 
the impression that it posed a threat to French education, and the interests of 
francophone New Hebrideans.
What I recall most clearly about the second AdCo in 1964–69, is not so much 
pressure from members for constitutional change (which was to be much greater 
in the third Council), but the emergence of the land question as the foremost 
issue of the political scene.
The land question
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, there was very extensive 
purchasing of land by Europeans, and especially by the agents of the company 
which, in 1894, became the Société Française des Nouvelles-Hébrides (SFNH), 
and particularly on the islands of Espiritu Santo, Malekula, Epi and Efate. 
By the time of the establishment in 1910 of the Joint Court (a primary function 
of which was to adjudicate land claims), applications lodged with it by European 
companies and individuals covered at least one-third of the total area of the 
New Hebrides. Many plantations had been created on the basis of these claims 
early in the twentieth century, long before the Joint Court was able to begin 
hearing land claims in 1927.
In the last decade or two of the nineteenth and the first two or three of the 
twentieth centuries, when European cotton and coconut plantations were being 
created, the indigenous population of the New Hebrides was either still in 
decline, or had barely begun its slow recovery. The effective alienation of land 
represented by these plantations did not, therefore, bring about shortages of 
cultivable land for most Melanesian villages. In 1953, land did not appear to be 
an important or urgent issue between New Hebrideans and Europeans. In the 
Port Vila area, however, the peri-urban villages of Fila Island, now known as 
Ifira Island, Mele, Pango, Erakor and Eratap were hemmed in by the Colardeau, 
Russet, Ohlen, SIP and other plantations and their populations were growing 
quickly. Of these villages it was probably Ifira that felt the most constricted 
by European settlement. On Fila Island there was, moreover, a strong feeling, 
manifest increasingly during the 1960s and 1970s, that a much greater 
area of land situated between the Blacksands and La Colle Rivers, had been 
appropriated for European-owned plantations (Frouin, Bladinières) than was 
acknowledged to have been sold in 1872 to a Britisher named William Bassett. 
It was hardly surprising, therefore, that Dr. John Kalsakau, a brother of Chief 
Graham Kalsakau of Fila Island, was the leading New Hebridean spokesman on 
land in AdCo.
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For most of the first two decades after the 1939–45 War, there was not very much 
new land development by Europeans. This relative stability in the extent of 
effective European land occupation began to change in the early 1960s, however, 
with the growth of cattle farming. Until this period, cattle had been regarded 
mainly as an adjunct to coconut planting, by keeping the grass short under 
the palms and providing meat for plantation labour, with some beef being sold 
to urban butchers. When some French landowners began extensive clearings 
of hitherto undeveloped land in south-east Santo, there was a New Hebridean 
reaction to this new phenomenon in the form of the Nagriamel movement. In the 
first ‘Act of Dark Bush’, drawn up in 1964 by joint leaders Mr. Jimmy Stevens 
and Chief Buluk, Nagriamel declared its objection to further European land 
development beyond existing plantations into the ‘dark bush’.9
It was against this background of an apparent renewal of European land 
development on Santo, and to a lesser extent on Efate, that two major debates 
on this subject initiated by New Hebridean members, took place in AdCo in 
1965 and 1967. Kalsakau was an articulate and eloquent exponent of Melanesian 
fears and resentments over land. He explained that in some cases, they knew 
land occupied by Europeans had not been properly bought. He pressed for 
the establishment of a land commission, which would investigate such cases. 
Kalsakau’s line was moderate. Where investigation by the Commission showed 
a European title to have been based on a defective claim, it would be possible, 
excepting instances of actual Melanesian land shortage, for the European 
concerned to remain in occupation, after paying compensation to the villagers. 
Kalsakau was at pains to assure the Council that he was not arguing for an 
upheaval over land, as this would be bad for the New Hebrides. However, 
before there was further land development, based on title awarded by the Joint 
Court, it should be ascertained whether this would create local shortages for 
New Hebrideans.
Understandably enough, since the great majority of alienated land was in French 
ownership, the FR was opposed to the proposed land commission, since it feared 
that to go behind the decisions of the Joint Court, which the Protocol decreed 
to be final, would jeopardise the whole basis of non-native land ownership. 
9  For further information on Nagriamel see J. Beasant, 1984, The Santo Rebellion: an Imperial Reckoning, 
Honolulu: Hawaii University Press; P. Bernard, 1983, I, Paris: Université Paris-X-Nanterre; B. Hours, 1974, 
Un mouvement politico-religieux néo-hébridais: le Nagriamel, Cahiers ORSTOM 11(3–4): 227–42; Hours, 1976, 
‘Leadership et cargo cult: l’irrésistible ascension de J.T.P.S. Moïse,’ Journal de la Société des Océanistes 32(2): 
207–31; W.F.S. Miles, 1998, Bridging Mental Boundaries in a Postcolonial Microcosm: Identity and Development 
in Vanuatu, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press; R. Shears, 1980, The Coconut War: The Crisis on Espiritu 
Santo, Sydney and Melbourne: Cassell Australia Limited; J.M. Stevens, 1995, ‘The Nagriamel movement,’ in 
Melanesian Politics: Stael Blong Vanuatu, ed. Howard Van Trease, Christchurch: Macmillan Brown Centre for 
Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury and Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of South Pacific, 
pp. 227–34; A. Stuart, 2001, Of Cargoes, Colonies and Kings: Diplomatic Administrative Service from Africa to 
the Pacific, London and New York: The Radcliffe Press, pp. 129– 223; M. Tabani, 2008, ‘The political history 
of the Nagriamel movement,’ Oceania 78: 332–57.
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Nevertheless, the BR was sympathetic to the idea of a commission, on the 
grounds that Europeans would benefit from the enhanced stability in a land 
tenure that would result from a fair settlement of land disputes between New 
Hebrideans and the holders of registered title. The land commission proposal 
was, however, left in limbo, although an ad hoc commission comprising both 
officials and some AdCo members did investigate a land dispute between two 
British title-holders and Melanesian villages at Bonkovia on Epi (1966). The 
investigation resulted in a compromise settlement of the dispute.
Disputes between New Hebrideans and Europeans over land became more 
frequent in the 1970s, especially when Europeans attempted to extend 
development on to land for which they held title but which had hitherto 
remained under bush. When these disputes occurred the District Agents did 
their best to bring about a settlement, but in most cases the Residencies also 
became involved. On a number of occasions I found myself discussing possible 
solutions with Fabre, my colleague at the FR, with whom I enjoyed an excellent 
working relationship over many years. In some of the more serious cases the 
dispute could only be ended, and possible breaches of public order avoided, 
by the European titleholder giving up part of his undeveloped land to the New 
Hebrideans who claimed custom ownership of it.
In the mid- to late-1970s, the RCs found it was necessary to send joint police 
detachments to deter villagers from taking possession of developed land owned 
by Europeans, although this type of dispute was exceptional. Land remained 
a political issue, but one that was not finally settled until independence, 
when non-indigenous freehold, based on titles awarded by the Joint Court, 
was abolished and all land was deemed to have reverted to New Hebridean 
customary ownership.
Nagriamel movement
As mentioned above, the Nagriamel movement was formed to resist the extension 
of European clearing of bush land for the purpose of grazing cattle. With its 
base at Vanafo, about twelve miles (19.3 kilometres) from Luganville, situated 
on land nominally owned by the SFNH, and where people from both the Santo 
bush and from outside Santo, especially Ambrym and Pentecost, had formed a 
community, the movement continued to oppose European land development in 
the ‘dark bush’ for the rest of the decade. In 1967, its joint leaders, Stevens and 
Buluk, together with a number of Ambrymese were prosecuted in the Court 
of First Instance for trespass and the removal of survey markers on land being 
purchased by William Ezra, (a Solomon Islander married to a New Hebridean) 
from a French settler named Allegre. Stevens and Buluk were sentenced to 
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several months’ imprisonment, and the Ambrymese men to lesser terms. Being 
anxious that Stevens and Buluk should not be seen as martyrs for trying to 
protect the ‘dark bush’ from further European encroachment, the BR procured 
a reduction in their sentences. As Stevens enjoyed the local status of British 
Protected Person, he served his sentence of four months in the British prison 
in Port Vila. I took advantage of his being there to talk to him on two or three 
occasions in my office, as I wanted to find out what sort of person he was, 
and to obtain some understanding of Nagriamel. On one of these occasions, I 
invited my FR counterpart, Jacques Fabre, to talk to Stevens, knowing as I did 
that Jimmy and his movement were considered by the FR to pose a great threat 
to French land interests on Santo and elsewhere. I found Stevens likeable and 
plausible, and possessing a degree of charisma, which explained the influence 
he had obtained over Santo bush people, and other New Hebrideans. I also came 
to the conclusion that he was genuine in wanting to protect bush land on Santo 
from further European expansion, whilst I suspected that he was also motivated 
by a degree of self-seeking. His later behaviour showed this suspicion to have 
been amply justified.
In the late 1960s and into the early 1970s, Nagriamel continued to agitate about 
land and in 1971 Jimmy Stevens even wrote to the United Nations, complaining 
that Nagriamel members had been chased off SFNH land on Malo Island by men 
with guns and a ‘great big buggery dog!’ The movement’s influence was extended 
to some of the northern islands (Malekula, Ambae, Epi) and especially in places 
where there were existing grievances over land occupied or claimed by non-
natives. However, the nature of the Nagriamel movement began to change in the 
early 1970s, as Stevens came under the influence of American land speculators, 
such as Harold Eugene Peacock and libertarian advocates, especially Michael 
Oliver and the Phoenix Foundation. By the mid-1970s, moreover, Stevens, once 
the bogey man of the FR and French settlers, had become their political ally.
Although I do not recall ever having discussed this subject with my French 
colleagues, I have always assumed the change in the FR’s policy regarding 
Nagriamel to have resulted from it having come to realise, by the early 1970s, 
that it would be possible to do business with Stevens. André Leconte’s dealings 
with Nagriamel over land (see below) would not have gone unnoticed by our 
colleagues. The adoption by the FR of a policy of returning undeveloped French 
State land to Melanesian ownership (especially on Malekula and Santo) may 
have influenced Stevens’ attitude towards the FR. Stevens was, moreover, venal 
and one cannot exclude the possibility that he envisaged obtaining financial 
gain by co-operating with the FR either directly via the French District 
Agency in Luganville, or indirectly through the alliance with Mouvement 
pour L’Autonomie des Nouvelles-Hébride (MANH). Be this as it may, the FR’s 
enlightened decision to help the Nagriamel community at Vanafo by providing 
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a dispensary and either a school, or a water supply scheme, or both, must have 
shown the movement’s leadership the material advantages of getting on side 
with the French, apart from their hostility to the NP.
Before leaving, for the time being, the subject of land, I must not omit to mention 
the wave of land speculation that began in or about 1967, with the arrival 
on the scene of Harold Eugene Peacock, who had previously been based in 
Hawai’i. Peacock came to the New Hebrides at a time when a number of French 
landowners were feeling some uncertainty about the political and economic 
future of the territory, and were by no means averse to selling land to Peacock. 
By 1970, or possibly earlier, he had acquired six properties, mainly on Santo, 
including one near Hog Harbour, purchased from a M. Graziani. Peacock’s long-
term intention was the subdivision of these properties into small plots, which 
he hoped to sell to Americans, and especially people who wanted a free and easy 
life style, with little taxation. His advertisements in Honolulu and elsewhere 
described his subdivisions, and their as yet non-existent amenities, in glowing 
and misleading terms.
The BR, in particular, viewed Peacock’s subdivision schemes with considerable 
misgivings. We feared that the settlement on Santo of several hundred, possibly 
more than a thousand, new American and other immigrants, would cause an 
adverse reaction amongst New Hebrideans, who were, as we have seen, already 
showing their concern regarding land alienation. We also thought that these 
new immigrants would expect, or even demand, public services which did not 
exist and which the Condominium could not afford to provide. In 1970 and 
1971, therefore, we began to urge on the FR (Robert Langlois was then FRC) the 
need for legislation to enable the Joint Administration to control the subdivision 
of land. Our colleagues, however, viewed the matter with less concern, partly 
because they realised that some French landowners welcomed the unexpected, 
and very agreeable, opportunity of selling advantageously land which they 
might not have been able to develop.
When, after much delay, a joint regulation for the control of subdivisions was 
finally issued in 1971 it was made retrospective in order to make its provisions 
applicable to the subdivisions which Mr Peacock was in the process of creating. 
This joint regulation (Joint Regulation No.15 of 1971) contained a clause to the 
effect that if an application to the Joint Administration for the approval of a 
subdivision had not been either approved or rejected within six months, it was 
deemed to have been approved. After Peacock had submitted applications for 
his subdivisions, month after month went by and it seemed increasingly likely 
that the FR was playing for time in order that the applications, which the BR 
opposed, would go through by default when the six months had elapsed. It 
took a special visit to Port Vila by Inspecteur-Général Jean-Jacques Robert (who 
was to be the last FRC, 1978–80) to bring the FR around to the British point 
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of view, and the consequent rejection of the Peacock subdivisions. Infuriated 
by this rebuff to his subdivision projects, Peacock resorted to legal action. 
Although he had opted for the French legal system as an individual,10 he had 
registered his company under British Company legislation. Either because of 
these circumstances, or because he was well aware that it was the BR that had 
defeated his projects, he instituted a law-suit against the BRC, Colin Allan, and 
the Assistant BRC, Mike Townsend, alleging that the giving of retrospective 
effect to the Joint Subdivision Regulation so as to reject his applications was an 
abuse of power, being both unconstitutional and inequitable.
That the BR had been justified in its apprehension of an adverse New 
Hebridean reaction to the arrival in the group of large numbers of purchasers 
of plots of Peacock’s projected subdivisions was shown to be valid in 1971. 
In the middle of that year, a demonstration in Port Vila to support the Joint 
Subdivision Regulation was organised by the newly-formed NP. I was absent 
on leave in Britain at the time, but it is my understanding that some leading 
New Hebrideans had become aware of mounting European settler opposition 
to the RCs’ policy of controlling subdivisions. This demonstration was the first 
significant public action undertaken by the NP, which had originated, early in 
1971, with a group of educated New Hebrideans, including Donald Kalpokas 
and Peter Taurakoto, who formed the New Hebrides Cultural Association. These 
two persons were both BR Assistant Education Officers. Thus began the ever-
increasing involvement with the NP (as the Cultural Association became) of 
New Hebrideans employed by the BR.
British and French relations in the movement 
towards independence
Because a large number of the confidential monthly reports sent by the FR 
to the French Government in Paris were carelessly left in boxes outside the 
French Offices, where they were discovered on 31 July 1980, it is known what 
the views of successive FRCs on Condominium matters were from 1966 until 
1978. I also know how I was regarded by my French colleagues during at least 
part of that period. In his report for December 1966, M. Jacques Mouradian 
(FRC 1964–69) said that the AdCo session for that month had been a quiet one, 
because Woodward, then on leave, had not been around to do any stirring! 
I was, in fact never guilty of inciting AdCo members to raise awkward 
10  Expatriates, who were nationals of neither Britain nor France, were required by the Protocol to opt 
within one month of arriving in the New Hebrides for either the British or French legal systems. They then 
became what was known as either British or French ressortissants and, if subsequently charged with a criminal 
offence, or sued under civil law, their cases fell to be treated under the legal system for which they had opted.
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questions. Again, the FRC’s report for May 1970, referred to me as ‘l’expert 
le plus chevronné de la Résidence Britannique en demagogie appliquée’ 
(the BR’s most experienced and hard-working expert in demagoguery)! 
This remark, equally unmerited, was made in connection with my accompanying 
Mr. George Kalkoa as his adviser to the Waigani Seminar (at Port Moresby) on 
the Politics of Melanesia. Much more important, however, was the inclusion, in 
the Report for September or October 1969, the last one sent by Mouradian, of 
his recommendations as to future French policy in the New Hebrides.
Mouradian contended that France could protect her long-term interests in 
the New Hebrides beyond independence by strengthening and increasing its 
influence among the New Hebridean population. To achieve this objective France 
should get as many Melanesian children as possible into French education. Also, 
since medical services and the co-operative’s support services were important to 
the New Hebrideans, these services, like education, should remain under French 
control, as an additional means of maintaining and increasing French influence. 
In contrast, the British, had few national interests in the New Hebrides, and 
were anxious to divest themselves of their responsibilities in the Condominium. 
As France needed time to achieve its objectives, it would be necessary to resist 
British pressure for rapid constitutional advance, and for the unification of the 
nationally-operated public services.
It was, indeed, British policy to work for the unification of public services 
provided separately by the two Condominium partners. In pursuance of this 
objective, there had been discussions in the mid-1960s between the British 
and French Chief Medical Officers, initiated on our side, about the replacement 
of the existing hospitals in Port Vila,11 which were old and inadequate, by a 
single jointly-operated new hospital. The French attitude had been sufficiently 
encouraging for the BR to believe that a joint hospital was a real possibility, so 
that planning for a new British Government hospital to replace Paton Memorial 
Hospital had been suspended for a year or more. When it finally became clear 
that France had, in fact, no intention of being involved in a joint hospital, 
there was a feeling in the BR that we had been misled, with the result that 
the construction of the much-needed new British Hospital had been needlessly 
delayed (it was not finally commissioned until mid-1975). The unification 
of national services did not take place until after my departure from the 
New Hebrides, although by that time (March 1978), independence was clearly 
not far off, and partial self-government had been instituted.
11  The older, the European, part of the French Hospital, in which I was very well looked after for three 
weeks in 1953, dated from 1911, and Paton Memorial Hospital on Iririki, built by the Presbyterian Mission, 
also dated from 1911. Both hospitals had given great and devoted service to the people of Port Vila and 
beyond. For me, and many others, the French hospital will always be associated with that wonderful lady, 
Soeur Marie-Adrien, who was its Matron for so many years, known affectionately as Soeur Marie Pique-fesse!
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AdCo, parties and ‘people power’
By 1969 the second AdCo had lasted for five years and it was obviously time 
for a change. Although there had been two meetings at Ministerial level about 
the Condominium in the mid-1960s, they had not resulted in any alteration 
in the French Government’s position regarding constitutional advance, and it 
is to be presumed that Mouradian’s recommendations had fallen on receptive 
ears in Paris. The BR therefore had no choice but to continue with the AdCo, 
which had already been in existence for eleven years. The two Residencies 
agreed, however, that the number of private, or unofficial, members should be 
increased from twenty to twenty-four, and that there should be eight instead 
of four New Hebridean members indirectly elected by local council members. 
There would be a small, but not insignificant departure from the principle of 
absolute parity of representation between New Hebridean and non-natives. 
While the number of New Hebridean (indirectly) elected members was increased 
from four to eight, that of non-native members chosen by the Chamber of 
Commerce Electoral College would only rise from four to six.
Although there had been some increase in the number of Local Councils 
representing New Hebrideans since 1964, there were still several islands or 
parts of islands, not covered by councils. Now that the number of indirectly 
elected AdCo members was to be doubled to eight, it would have been unfair 
to a significant proportion of the New Hebridean population for all of these 
members to be chosen exclusively by the Local Councils. In consultation with 
the District Agents, therefore, it was decided that the electoral colleges for each 
of the four Districts would, in addition to Local Council members, also include 
representatives of non-Council villagers. When suggesting this arrangement to 
my French colleague I was by no means sure how it would work in practice, 
but in the event, our ever-resourceful District Agents were able to organise the 
representation for the non-Council areas on the electoral colleges to the apparent 
satisfaction of all concerned.
Because of the distance in time, I cannot, unfortunately recall much about the 
changes in membership between the 1964 to 1969 AdCo, and its successor. 
I remember that George Kalkoa (later Ati George Sokomanu) was elected by 
the Central District No. 1 (CD1) Electoral College, and (to my regret) Dr. John 
Kalsakau ceased to be a member. Fr. Gérard Leymang was one of the six nominated 
New Hebridean members. On the European side, M. Philippe Delacroix, a Port 
Vila businessman, became a member, and the leader of the Anglican Church in 
the New Hebrides, Archdeacon Derek Rawcliffe, replaced Pastor Bob Murray. 
The new AdCo was much less docile than its predecessors, and when it was 
convened for the 1971–72 (or 1973) end of year budget session, the members 
refused to begin examining the Condominium Estimates until they had been 
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granted an immediate adjournment for a few days, so that they could study and 
discuss them. The estimates had been given to them only after their arrival in 
Port Vila. There was more pressure from members on all sides of the Council, 
and especially from the British and New Hebrideans, for the replacement of 
AdCo by a legislative body. There was also demand for land reform, in which 
George Kalkoa was prominent.
AdCo members, and other people agitating for more constitutional advance, 
especially the recently-formed NP, received a cold douche when a high-ranking 
French Minister, M. Pierre Mesmer, visited the New Hebrides in May 1972. 
In a speech delivered to a large audience at the reception in his honour at the 
FR, he squarely stated that the time was not ripe for constitutional advance 
at central government level. Instead, the people of the New Hebrides should 
prepare themselves for that by learning how to run their own affairs through 
experience in local government. I was present when Mesmer made this oration, 
and I immediately appreciated its significance. We would have to wait for a few 
more years before the Condominium could progress beyond the AdCo stage.
The NP, however, was in no mood to conform patiently with Mesmer’s views. By 
1973, its President, the young Anglican priest, Fr. Walter Lini, was already calling 
for independence to be brought about by 1977, and the party’s membership, 
which was overwhelmingly composed of anglophone Melanesians, and adherents 
of the Presbyterian and Anglican churches, was growing rapidly. By the end of 
that year, moreover, the NP had shown its teeth in no uncertain manner.
On 27 December 1973 the NP, which the British Police had known to be planning 
a demonstration at least two or three days ahead, swarmed into the grounds 
of the FR Secretariat to demand the immediate release from the French prison 
in Santo of two brothers of the prominent Rarua family of Tongoa, who were 
held on remand accused of assaulting a milicien (a Melanesian constable in the 
French Police Force). This was a controversial case, and it had been agreed at 
Residency level that it should be tried by the Joint Court, and not the Native 
Court, which would otherwise have had jurisdiction. In the meantime, the 
Acting FRC, Jacques Fabre, had agreed with us that the two accused should 
be released, pending the trial. Unfortunately, and although (knowing the NP 
demonstration was likely) I had called on Fabre at home on Sunday 26 December 
to urge the immediate release of the two men: this was not ordered in time. 
The result was that Fabre had to agree, from the veranda of the French Office, 
to telephone Santo to obtain the brothers’ release from gaol, under pressure 
of a shouting mob of New Hebrideans. I had accompanied the Assistant BRC, 
Mike Townsend, to the scene, in order to talk to the NP leaders, and to try and 
ensure things did not get out of hand. I shall always remember the sight of the 
personnel of the FR, looking understandably somewhat apprehensive, clustered 
along the veranda railings. The future President of Vanuatu, Kalkot Matas Kele-
A Political Memoir of the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides 
33
Kele (2004–2009), then very much a young political firebrand, appeared to be 
orchestrating the demonstration and I recall trying to calm him down. I stayed 
around talking to demonstrators, who were not really in a dangerous mood, 
until they began to disperse. Detachments of both the British and French Police 
Forces had tried to prevent the demonstration occupying the Secretariat garden 
but had been ignored. It was, I suppose one could say, the first show of people 
power in the New Hebrides. More was to follow.
Up to this point, the NP had no rivals on the political scene, although I recall 
Philippe Delacroix, ex-parachutist and future hard-line Santo secessionist, 
made a well-meant, but short-lived, first attempt to form a moderate progressive 
party, which he named, Union des Populations des Nouvelles-Hébrides (UPNH). 
Such support as UPNH had was among francophone New Hebrideans, and 
I remember one of them coming to talk to me about it. I was friendly with 
Delacroix, as we were both members of the Board of Management of the Port 
Vila Cultural Centre.
Early in January 1974, and probably in reaction to the NP’s 27 December 
demonstration, which arose from a matter concerning Santo, the Mouvement 
pour L’Autonomie des Nouvelles-Hébrides (MANH) was formed in Luganville.12 
This movement had as its core membership the French population of Santo. 
There were also some francophone New Hebridean adherents, including the 
late Aimé Maleré of North Malekula. I seem to remember that the name of the 
movement was felt to be too radical, and was soon changed to, Mouvement 
Autonomiste des Nouvelles-Hébrides, but it didn’t really matter, as the party 
was invariably known as MANH. I do not recall that it had any particular policy, 
other than that of opposition to the NP, and the traditional Santo dislike of Port 
Vila. Despite the word autonomie or autonomiste in its title, MANH was not 
in favour of early independence. Jimmy Stevens’ Nagriamel shared MANH’s 
antipathy towards the NP, and the two movements were to become closely 
linked, being usually referred to as MANH-Nagriamel.
It is probably true to say that UCNH, which was set up in March or April 1974, 
also owed much to a movement of reaction against the NP, aggravated by the 
latter’s demonstration at the FR. UCNH was, despite its name, essentially the 
party of the French people living in Port Vila and in the southern New Hebrides, 
together with francophone New Hebrideans. Whilst declaring itself favourable 
to constitutional advance, UCNH opposed the early independence demanded by 
12  For further information on the origins of MANH see Kalkot Matas Kele-Kele, 1977, ‘The emergence of 
political parties,’ in New Hebrides: Road to Independence, ed. Chris Plant, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, 
University of South Pacific, pp. 17–34, pp. 30–32. Howard Van Trease, 1995, ‘Colonial origins of Vanuatu 
politics,’ in Melanesian Politics: Stael Blong Vanuatu, ed. Howard Van Trease, Christchurch: Macmillan Brown 
Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury and Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of South 
Pacific, pp. 3–58, pp. 26–27.
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the NP. Its francophone Melanesian members, who were mainly Catholic, feared 
that a NP Government could threaten French education, and the employment of 
francophones. Among its principal leaders were the popular Rémy Delaveuve, a 
keen footballer, Guy Prévot, and Jean-Marie Leyhe, an AdCo member. Leymang 
and Vincent Boulekone also became prominent members of UCNH.
In July 1974 the NP staged another demonstration in Port Vila, and briefly occupied 
the Condominium Office building. This was in protest about a New Hebridean 
being killed on the Mele road by a European, notorious for fast driving.
British and French dialogues on the future
During 1973 and 1974 we were hearing from the Foreign Office in London that 
there was soon to be an Anglo-French Ministerial meeting to discuss the future 
of the New Hebrides, but this meeting did not, in fact, take place until November 
1974. Early in that year the Gaullist President of France, M. George Pompidou, 
died and had been replaced by the more liberal Valery Giscard d’Estaing. I have 
always thought that it was this change at the top which brought about a reversal 
of the previous French Government policy of resistance to constitutional advance 
in the New Hebrides. However, the coming into being at the beginning of 1974 
of two francophone political parties, both of which wanted greater popular 
participation in the running of the Condominium, (even if they were opposed to 
independence) may also have had a bearing on the new willingness of the French 
Government to consider some degree of movement towards self-government.
When the November 1974 date for the long-awaited Anglo-French Ministerial 
meeting had been fixed, the British and French Residencies in the New Hebrides 
were given only a comparatively short time to prepare joint proposals for 
consideration by Ministers. The two RCs, Mr. R.W.H. (later Sir Roger) du Boulay 
and M. M.R. Langlois, were to take these proposals with them to London, where 
they would attend the meeting.
Soon after the date of the Ministerial meeting was announced du Boulay asked 
me to accompany him to the FR, as he had arranged to discuss with Langlois 
the preparations for the London talks. Somewhat to my surprise, the Chancelier, 
Jacques Fabre, was not present. It had obviously been made known to the FR 
that the French Government was at last ready to contemplate a significant 
further stage of constitutional advance, since Langlois very quickly evoked the 
prospect of elections being held in the New Hebrides. At this point, I must 
mention, since it will make clearer what follows, that by this time (October 
1974), the NP had a high profile, because of its demands for early independence, 
and the two large demonstrations that it had held in Port Vila in December 
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1973 and July 1974. The NP had thus become something of a bogey for the 
French population of the Condominium, and its policies were viewed with some 
apprehension by francophone New Hebrideans.
The FRC expressed anxiety as to the likely reaction of the French community, 
perhaps some kind of backlash, in the event of the NP obtaining a large majority 
in future elections. He wondered whether the chances of such an outcome could 
be lessened by the découpage (fixing the boundaries) of electoral constituencies. 
Du Boulay lent forward, ‘Ah,’ he said, ‘you mean gerrymandering.’ It was with 
difficulty that I stopped myself from laughing at the frankness of this remark, as 
it was perfectly obvious to me that Langlois had meant precisely that, although 
he had put the matter more delicately. The term gerrymandering, with its 
connotations of fixing electoral boundaries in Northern Ireland to prevent the 
fair representation of Roman Catholics in that troubled province, is sometimes 
used in France, but if Langlois knew its pejorative nature, he showed no sign of 
taking offence at his colleague’s use of it.
For me, this discussion, at which I was so glad to have been present, was most 
instructive. I shared the FRC’s apprehension at the possibility of the NP obtaining 
a big majority of the seats in the forthcoming elections, because I knew that 
this majority could be even greater than its potential electoral support in the 
New Hebridean population would justify, especially if we failed to give very 
careful consideration to the arrangement of electoral constituencies, and the 
voting system. This was because the New Hebrideans opposed to the NP, although 
forming a significant minority (at least one third of the overall indigenous 
population), did not constitute a majority in any of the major islands, with the 
possible exception of Tanna. I realised, therefore, that anything resembling the 
British electoral system, with its single-seat constituencies, and first past the 
post voting system, would have to be avoided.
Designing an electoral system for the New 
Hebrides
If I dwell somewhat at length on this subject, I must ask the reader’s indulgence, 
because it is true to say that the electoral system still in use in Vanuatu today 
owes its origin to that meeting between Messrs du Boulday, Langlois and me at 
the FR in October 1974, and to the inspiration that I derived from it.
Because Jacques Fabre had not been present at the discussion referred to above, 
it was, I suppose, normal that I should take the initiative in preparing proposals 
for the approval of the two RCs, and submission to the Ministers at the London 
meeting. I had, moreover, much more time than had Fabre to devote to the matter.
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As Secretary for Political Affairs at the BR, my primary function was to deal with 
constitutional advance, and I had little else, at that time, to distract my attention 
from this subject. In his position as Chancelier at the FR (as No.2 to the FRC) Fabre 
had much less time to give to political matters, as—with the probable exception 
of finance—just about everything with which the FR was concerned passed 
over his desk. In these circumstances, I think he was content for me to do the 
initial spade work, as I found subsequently that he had not prepared proposals 
on his own account. It was the unwritten convention between the Residencies, 
and the most practical and sensible way of working the Condominium system of 
administration, for one Residency to work on the details of a given project and 
then to submit proposals for the agreement of the other Residency, rather than 
for both to be working on a given matter simultaneously, and in detail. Thus, 
when the decision in principle had been taken by the two Governments that 
municipal authorities should be set up in Port Vila and Santo, we in the BR were 
content to let the French prepare a project based on French local government 
practice, although I made a point, in 1971, of spending several days in a typical 
small ‘commune’ in France to see for myself how the French system worked.
When considering what kind of electoral system would be appropriate for the 
inauguration of democracy in the New Hebrides, my primary concern was the 
need to ensure that it should be fair to each of the main political, or quasi-
political groups. It seemed to me that the key to the problem was découpage, the 
word mentioned by Langlois, concerning the arrangement of constituencies. 
Although du Boulay had interpreted découpage as gerrymandering, this may 
well not have been Langlois’ intention, and I felt reasonably confident that 
our purpose could be achieved in an objective way. We had not much time to 
prepare proposals for the London conference.
To ensure reasonably balanced representation in the future legislative body of 
the main political interests, something akin to proportional representation (PR) 
would be needed. However, no information about PR systems was available to 
me, and, in any case, I knew that such systems usually involved complicated 
voting arrangements, which would not be suitable for the New Hebrides, where 
nearly everybody would be voting for the first time, and where, moreover, many 
voters would be illiterate. It was essential, therefore, that our electoral system 
should be fairly simple, so that as many people as possible could cast valid votes.
The main problem was posed by the rural areas of the Group, with their 
population spread over many islands, some large and some small. A separate, 
and different, electoral system would be needed for the two towns of Port Vila 
and Luganville, in which the populations were more concentrated. I quickly 
came to the conclusion that the division of the New Hebrides, Banks and 
Torres into single-seat constituencies would result in the NP obtaining more 
representatives in the future legislature than its strength could justify. This was 
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because the NP, which drew its support from the numerous members of the 
Presbyterian and Anglican Churches, was in the majority in so many islands, 
whereas its opponents were scattered around the islands, although constituting 
about a third of the Melanesian population. They were the adherents of the 
Catholic and French Protestant Churches, the followers of the John Frum and 
Nagriamel movements, together with pagan communities, such as the Big and 
Small Nambas on Malekula, and ‘custom’ people on Pentecost, Ambrym, Malo 
and Tanna. As for the minority anglophone Protestant Churches or ‘sects’, at 
that time the Church of Christ, the Apostolic Church (based only on Ambae) 
and the Seventh-day Adventists, I think their political allegiance was divided. 
Many, perhaps most, Church of Christ members opposed the NP because of their 
Church’s association with Jimmy Stevens and Nagriamel. I do not know whether 
the Seventh-day Adventists, who were present in small communities on Santo, 
Aore, Ambae, Tanna and in the Shepherd Islands, were NP supporters or not.
The division of each of the largest or most populous islands of Espiritu Santo, 
Malekula and Tanna into two or three constituencies would have been difficult 
without the Joint Administration being suspected of gerrymandering for the 
purpose of favouring the electoral chances of one or other of the political 
groups. Therefore, I dismissed at the outset of my planning any ideas of such 
divisions. Instead, I chose the alternative of making these islands multi-seat 
constituencies, with each returning three representatives.
In opting for multi-seat constituencies, I also had in mind the existence on each 
of these three islands of a substantial political minority, which ought to be 
represented in the legislature. Thus, the three-seat Santo constituency (which 
would include Malo, Aore and the nearby small islands along its coasts) could 
be expected to have a majority of NP supporters, because so many Presbyterians 
lived in it. In comparison, the adherents of Nagriamel and Tabwemasama 
constituted a significant political minority opposing the NP, and should 
certainly be represented. Likewise the three-seat constituency of Malekula and 
nearby small islands, although having a majority of Presbyterians, who would 
vote for the NP, also had a significant anti-NP minority of Catholics, Nagriamel 
adherents and Charlemagne Protestants, who had to be represented. On Tanna, 
however, supporters and opponents of the NP were more evenly divided. 
Whilst the Presbyterians could be expected to vote for the NP, the adherents of 
John Frum and people in ‘custom’ villages would not, and they might form the 
majority of the island.
The problem confronting us was not only one of creating objectively valid 
electoral constituencies for the whole of the New Hebrides, Banks and Torres 
Islands, but also one of devising a system of voting for a rural population of 
which many members were illiterate. It was most important that it should be 
simple, so as to minimise the number of wasted, unfulfilled votes.
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I discussed this matter with Fabre. We agreed that, at least where the rural 
voters were concerned, people should not have to be able to read candidates’ 
names on ballot-papers, and be required to indicate their choice by marking 
the papers, for example, by putting a cross against the chosen name. Jacques 
told me that, in some French territories (I think New Caledonia was mentioned) 
voters were given, upon entering the polling station, ballot-papers for each of 
the candidates. These not only bore the candidate’s name, but also the electoral 
symbol of his party, and were in different colours, according to the candidate’s 
party. The voter had to take the ballot-papers of all the candidates into the 
polling booth, where he or she would pick out the one of his or her choice, and 
then deposit it in the ballot-box in an envelope, leaving the other papers in the 
polling booth. I immediately recognised the value of this system.
There are a number of different systems of proportional representation in use 
around the world, but none of them would have been suited to our requirements. 
What I sought to achieve was an electoral system which would give roughly 
proportional results, by ensuring as far as reasonably possible, that the various 
political parties were represented.
As the date of the election approached, and I gave further thought to the 
mechanics of voting, I foresaw a difficulty that would confront illiterate voters 
in the multi-seat constituencies. They would be given a ballot paper for each 
of the candidates put up by the various parties contesting the constituency. It 
was very important, indeed vital, that every voter, illiterate as well as literate, 
should be able to distinguish between the ballot papers of the candidates of his 
chosen party, as he would have been told by that party’s election organisers 
which candidate to cast his ballot for. It happened that Kalkot Matas Kele-Kele 
came into my office one day when I was thinking about these matters (I rarely 
thought about much else), or perhaps I had asked him to drop by. Kalkot, who 
had begun a law course a year or so earlier at the University of Papua New 
Guinea, Port Moresby, had obtained permission to take a year out, in order 
to organise the NP’s election campaign. I explained the voting system to him, 
and in the course of doing so, mentioned the problem of illiterate voters. It is 
possible that it only occurred to me then, as I talked to him—I am not sure 
now. Be that as it may, Kalkot said to me, ‘What about putting photographs on 
the ballot papers?’ I saw at once that this was the answer, and wondered why I 
hadn’t thought of it myself.
When I discussed the use of candidates’ photos on ballot papers with my 
colleague at the FR, I did not tell him that the idea had come from Kalkot. This 
was not because I wished to claim the credit for someone else’s idea, but because 
of the very strong anti-NP feeling in the FR. This made me afraid that the photo 
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idea might be rejected, if its origin was known. In fact, the value of photographs 
was immediately appreciated by the FR, despite the additional expense and 
organisational work that would be involved.
An essential element of the proposal that I prepared for the agreement of the 
FR was the creation of multi-member constituencies, that is, with either two or 
three seats in the legislature, for each of those areas of the Condominium where 
there were substantial numbers of people supporting the NP and opposing it. 
In other areas, where the people were all of one political persuasion, because 
they all, or virtually all, belonged to one religious denomination, there would 
be single-member constituencies. The three-member ones would be Santo 
(excluding Luganville), Malekula and Tanna and the two-member ones would 
be Ambae-Maevo, Pentecost and Ambrym. The single-member constituencies 
would be Banks and Torres, Epi-Paama and Tongoa-Shepherd Islands, Efate 
(excluding Port Vila) and nearby small islands, and finally Southern District 
Outer Islands (Erromango, Aneytium, Futuna and Aniwa). Almost all of the 
populations of these last five constituencies belonged to the Presbyterian and 
Anglican Churches from which the NP derived nearly all its support.
The second essential element was the principle of only one vote to be cast by 
each elector. Allied with this was the principle that illiteracy would not prevent 
anyone from casting a valid vote.
To help the reader understand my proposed electoral system, and how I hoped 
to achieve the approximate proportional representation of the political parties, 
I shall take Malekula as an example. Together with its numerous nearby islands, 
such as the Maskelynes, Vao and Atchin, Malekula was to be a three-member 
constituency. The majority of its population was Presbyterian, and could be 
expected to support the NP, but there was a substantial minority which would 
not. This minority was composed of the Catholics of the Lamap-Port Sandwich 
area, and those inhabiting the islands of Vao, Wala and Rano, together with 
the Charlemagne Protestant community of North-East Malekula, and some 
Nagriamel villagers. I thought that these various groups probably amounted to 
about one-third of the population of the constituency. There were Seventh-day 
Adventists (SDAs) on Atchin Island, and at Tenmaru, N.W. Malekula, but I did 
not know where their political sympathies lay.
There were enough NP supporters in the constituency to return two NP 
members to the Assembly, and enough people opposed to the NP to elect the 
third member. If things turned out like that, well and good, and there would be 
proportional representation of this constituency. Such a desirable result could 
not, however, be counted on. Each of the political parties contesting Malekula 
had the choice of putting up one, two or three candidates. If, as was likely, the 
NP decided to field three, its election organisers would be well advised to make 
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sure, as far as they could by canvassing the party’s supporters, that the latter 
did not all vote for one particularly well-known, or popular person. If they 
were not to do that, the NP could end up winning only one of the three seats, 
instead of the two, which its numerical strength made attainable. Conversely, 
their opponents, if unwise enough to present three candidates, could let the NP 
win all three seats, especially if their limited voting strength was to be spread 
more or less evenly over their candidates. If that happened, each of their three 
candidates might get fewer votes than any one of the NP’s. To prevent either of 
these equally undesirable outcomes, voters in every part of the large Malekula 
constituency would need to observe strict discipline in obeying the instructions 
of their party’s officials as to which of its candidates to vote for.
The twin dangers of the bunching of votes on only one candidate out of two or 
three, and that of the votes of the minority party being thinly spread over too 
many candidates, were inherent in this proposed electoral system. They would, 
therefore, confront party organisers in each of the two- and three-member 
constituencies. If my colleague, Jacques Fabre, accepted my proposals, despite 
these dangers, it was presumably because he realised that they offered the best 
chance of the political minorities opposed to the NP being fairly represented, 
and that any alternative system would unduly favour the majority NP. It seems 
that our respective RCs were content with what we had agreed upon. My boss, 
Mr. du Boulay, never questioned me about them. I later inferred from one of his 
file minutes that he thought the FR had originated them, and I was quite content 
to let him continue in this assumption. The important thing was that both 
Ministers and our local politicians should regard the electoral arrangements as 
being equally favoured by each Residency. If it had come to the ears of UCNH, 
or MANH-Nagriamel that I was the author of them, they would immediately 
have suspected the system was designed to ensure the victory of the NP. In fact, 
of course, it was intended to ensure, if only they understood the opportunities 
for them that it offered, that these minority groups got a fair crack of the 
electoral whip.
In the event, when the election for the first Representative Assembly (RA) was 
held on 1 November 1975, the electoral system that I have tried to describe 
above yielded the kind of result that I had hoped for. I do not, however, wish 
to anticipate matters by writing in any detail about that election at this stage. 
For the present, it will suffice to say that the two main political parties, the 
NP and the Modérés (Moderates), as the FR was pleased to call the collection 
of parties and movements opposing the NP, obtained respectively the number 
of seats corresponding fairly closely to the percentages of votes cast for them. 
Something approximating to proportional representation was thus achieved, 
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without the complexity of a formal PR system, with no NP landslide victory, 
and the Moderates winning at least one seat in every one of the two and three 
member constituencies.
I am conscious of having dwelt at considerable length on the electoral system 
for the RA, and I must hope that my readers have not been either too bored, 
or somewhat confused, by this rather arcane subject. I plead forgiveness on 
two grounds, however. The first is that the system continued to be used, not 
only for the 1979 parliamentary elections, but also for such elections beyond 
Independence, perhaps because it was found easier to keep what already existed 
than to devise a new system, a process which might have led to a good deal of 
controversy, since one or other of the political parties would probably have 
thought itself to be disadvantaged. The second is that I regard my work on 
constitutional advance, beginning with the introduction of indirect elections 
for AdCo in 1964, going on (in close co-operation with Jacques Fabre) to the 
planning of municipal government in the early 1970s, then culminating in the 
1975 electoral system, as my most worthwhile achievements during my career 
at the BR.
London conference in 1974 and constitutional 
developments
At the London Conference in November 1974, at which the British Government 
was represented by Miss Joan Lestor, then a junior minister in the Foreign 
Office and the French by M. Olivier Stirn, then Secretary of State for Overseas 
Departments and Territories, the first major decisions concerning the future 
constitutional development of the New Hebrides were taken for more than 
twenty years.13 These included the establishment of a Representative Assembly 
upon which would be conferred fairly wide legislative powers and the majority 
of the members of which were to be elected by universal suffrage. Ministers also 
decided that Municipal and Rural Community Councils, likewise to be based on 
universal suffrage, should be established in the New Hebrides. It was intended 
that the Rural Community Councils should progressively replace the Local 
13 In this and in the three following paragraphs the narrative will begin to incorporate part – here paragraphs 
7 to 10 – of the rather long history of constitutional advance, which I wrote in January–February 1978, and 
which was an official document, intended for circulation by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to British 
diplomatic posts in countries likely to have an interest in the New Hebrides. It also went to the Governors 
of the remaining British dependent territories of the South Pacific. See Keith Woodward, ‘Keith Woodward – 
Historical summary of constitutional advance in the New Hebrides, 1954-1977,’ Canberra: Pacific Manuscripts 
Bureau, [2001], held State Library of New South Wales, Manuscripts, Oral History and Pictures, online: http://
acms.sl.nsw.gov.au/item/itemDetailPaged.aspx?itemID=441498, accessed 21 July 2014.
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Councils, which had been functioning in some islands—with varying degrees 
of success—for from ten to fifteen years, but which the FR had never regarded 
as satisfactory.
The RA was to include a certain number of members who would specifically 
represent economic interests. Following discussions between the British 
and French Residencies and further reference to the two Governments, the 
proposals for the composition of the Assembly which were submitted to the 
last session of AdCo in April 1975 provided for six members to be elected by 
the Chamber of Commerce Electoral College and for three members to be chosen 
by the combined governing Committees of the British and French supervised 
Co-operatives Associations. The six members to be chosen by the Chamber of 
Commerce Electorate would be non-New Hebridean, that is, persons of either 
British or French legal status, as were the Chamber of Commerce electors. 
Although the Chamber of Commerce Electoral College had been considerably 
expanded—to about six hundred persons—by 1975 (as a result of two new 
sections being added to the Chamber), this particular kind of representation 
was the direct descendent of the Chamber of Commerce representation in AdCo, 
which had already been severely criticised by AdCo members as early as 1969, 
when the then FRC, Mouradian, stated that he would not want to see this 
kind of representation in a successor body to AdCo. The three members of the 
Assembly chosen by the co-operatives’ governing bodies were, of course, to be 
New Hebrideans since the membership of co-operative societies was exclusively 
indigenous.
Although the RA, as envisaged by Ministers at the London Conference, was 
not intended to include custom chiefs, the decision to do so was taken within 
two months, as a result of proposals made by leading New Hebrideans (not as a 
specifically political party idea) during the visit of Miss Lestor and M. Stirn to 
Port Vila in January 1975. AdCo at its final meeting in April that year approved 
the Residencies’ proposal to include four chiefs in the RA to be elected—one 
for each District—by an Electoral College of Chiefs divided into four sections.
It is of minor historical interest to note that the Ministers agreed at the London 
Conference that two more New Hebridean members should be added to AdCo 
for the double purpose of giving New Hebrideans a majority, and of providing 
specific representation in the Council for the two major political parties, since 
one member was to be nominated by the NP and the other by UCNH. Thus, 
for the last two meetings of AdCo in December 1974 and April 1975, its total 
membership rose to thirty-two, including fourteen New Hebrideans and twelve 
European private members. In a lengthy document dated 13 January 1975 and 
submitted to the RCs immediately prior to the arrival of the two Ministers 
at Port Vila, the NP rigorously criticised the decisions taken at the London 
Conference, both because of their content and because no representatives of 
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the New Hebridean people had taken part in the Conference. Some account was 
taken by the Residencies of the NP’s criticisms of the composition proposed for 
the Assembly, since the number of rural seats was increased from seventeen 
to twenty and the number of members to represent Economic Interests was 
reduced from the original twelve to nine. As provided in the Exchange of Notes 
between the British and French Governments of 29 August 1975,14 the RA was 
to be composed of forty-two members—twenty-nine to be elected by universal 
suffrage, nine to represent Economic Interests and four Chiefs. Whilst the 
twenty members who were to represent the rural areas would be elected by all 
communities voting on a common roll without distinction of race or legal status, 
a rather elaborate cross-voting system was instituted for the representation of 
the two towns, where the great majority of the non-New Hebridean population 
resided. The purpose of this system, as indeed of the representation of Economic 
Interests through the Chamber of Commerce Electorate, was to ensure that a 
minimum number of non-natives would be included in the Assembly, although 
it was fully accepted by the two Governments that there would be a substantial 
majority of New Hebrideans, since virtually all of the rural members could be 
expected to be indigenous. The representation of the two towns was prescribed 
as follows:
•	 Port Vila – two British, two French and two New Hebridean members
•	 Santo – one British, one French and one New Hebridean.
In the two towns, people in each community, British, French and New 
Hebridean, were obliged to vote for at least one candidate in each of the three 
legal categories, failing which their votes would not be valid.
The joint visit to the New Hebrides of Miss Joan Lestor and M. Olivier Stirn 
was a memorable occasion in the short history of the Condominium. Ministerial 
visits were rare events on both sides and I think I am safe in asserting that 
there had never before been a joint visit of British and French Ministers. I recall 
sitting next to Joan Lestor, a rather Junoesque, and quite attractive lady, on a 
social occasion at the BR on Iririki, and explaining to her some aspect or other of 
local politics. She listened politely, but I did not feel that the matter could have 
been of much interest to her, lacking as she probably was, relevant background 
knowledge. I also had a brief chat with Olivier Stirn. He did not ask me any 
questions, but proceeded, at some length, and with considerable enthusiasm, 
to expound to me the desirability of having television in the New Hebrides. 
Fortunately, he did not ask me what I thought about his idea, which bristled 
with practical difficulties, not least of which was the dispersal of the greater part 
of the population beyond the range of television transmitters in Port Vila and 
14  The normal way of effecting amendments to the Protocol.
A Political Memoir of the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides
44
Luganville. I couldn’t help wondering whether Stirn saw TV as a kind of sop to 
the masses, a means of distracting the New Hebridean population from political 
aspirations, and especially demands for independence.
The two Ministers held a joint meeting with Members of AdCo (and perhaps 
also political leaders but I am not sure now). They must have talked about the 
decisions taken at the London Conference, and no doubt invited questions 
and comments. It was at this meeting, which I attended (but only have a hazy 
memory of) that the suggestion was made that some chiefs should be included in 
the future RA. I cannot recall who made it, but it received general support, and 
probably appeared harmless to the two Ministers. The Moderates, and no doubt 
the FR, would have seen the inclusion of chiefs as another means of countering 
radical NP influence in the Assembly. It was not then foreseen that the choosing 
of the chiefs would be politicised. The question of independence did come up 
at the meeting with Ministers, and one of the NP AdCo Members—it may have 
been Iolu Abbil—expressed the opinion that it would, or should, come about 
by 1980. This proved to be an accurate prediction, or expression of hope.
It is still my opinion now, as it was in 1975, that the composition proposed 
for the first RA was fair and reasonable, given the circumstances of the time. 
It was devised to ensure that there would be a minimum of twelve non-native 
members, but these would be heavily outnumbered—nearly three times—by 
the New Hebrideans. The contribution of the European community to the 
economy of the Condominium was a very important one, justifying at this stage 
this community being over-represented in relation to its percentage of overall 
population. It was also arguable that the knowledge and experience that the 
majority of the European members could be expected to possess would enable 
them to give direction to the deliberations of the Assembly, and to constitute a 
stabilising factor. For reasons which will become apparent later, the principal 
one being that the NP was unjustly deprived of its majority, the first RA was 
never really given a chance.
Electoral registration and political 
developments in Santo and Tanna
Registration of electors for the RA election began in late March 1975 and was 
completed at the beginning of November, in time for the election to be held 
during the second week of that month.15 Although the NP had proposed that 
15 Keith Woodward, 1978. ‘Historical Summary of Constitutional Advance in the New Hebrides, 1954–
1977,’ 77 typescript pages, Pacific Manuscript Bureau 1151, Canberra, The Australian National University, 
paragraph 11.
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the minimum voting age should be eighteen, the majority of AdCo members 
were more conservatively minded and the Council recommended that twenty-
one should be the minimum voting age. Although AdCo had recommended 
that expatriates should be permitted to vote in the election for the RA after 
a minimum period of five years’ residence in the Group, the residential 
qualification which was finally provided for in the Exchange of Notes of 29 
August 1975 was three years. Candidates for election were required to be at 
least twenty-five years of age.
The brevity of the preceding paragraph of my Historical Summary prevents 
it from conveying an adequate idea of the size of the task of the registration 
of electors, and its inherent difficulties.16 The Residencies agreed on two basic 
principles, namely that as far as humanly possible every political voter should 
be registered, and that precautions should be taken against electoral fraud. 
The District Agents in each of the four districts had to organise electoral 
registration teams, each composed of at least two persons, whose task it 
was to visit every village and settlement in each of the rural constituencies. 
They issued electoral cards to every man and woman aged at least twenty-one, 
and established lists of electors, which were separate for each polling station. 
When planning this electoral registration programme, in consultation with the 
District Agents, we realised that a major difficulty for the registration teams 
would be determining whether young adults had attained the requisite voting 
age of twenty-one, since the registration of births, deaths and marriages had not 
been in existence long enough for more than a small number of young children to 
have had their births officially registered. Though a Joint Regulation providing 
for the registration of the births, deaths and marriages of New Hebrideans 
had been issued in 1972 or 1973, the registration teams usually had to accept 
statements as to age by the person concerned, or from people who knew him 
or her well. However, if the oral evidence seemed inadequate they could form 
a rough and ready judgement of age from the appearance of the applicant. 
Recourse was also had to church baptismal registers or certificates, when these 
were available. I never enquired to what extent such documentary proof of age 
was found by the registration teams, but I doubt that it was significant.
The registration teams were mainly formed from District Agency staffs, but 
teachers were also roped in for the work, where this could be done without 
detriment to school work. Most of the registration personnel were Melanesian. 
To minimise the risk of partisan considerations influencing their work, especially 
where the determination of age was concerned, teams were normally composed of 
one British and one French Administration employee. As will be seen, allegations 
were made, especially from the French side, after the elections to the effect that 
16  Woodward, ‘Historical Summary.’
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there had been widespread under-age registration for political purposes, but 
very little evidence of this was adduced, and I was satisfied that the registration 
teams had done a remarkably good job, often in difficult conditions.
It was fortuitous that by 1975 many villagers throughout the New Hebrides had 
acquired transistor radios, and thus through this medium, could be informed 
about the forthcoming elections and the impending arrival in their localities of 
electoral registration teams. The overwhelming majority of the rural people was 
very happy to be registered, but I recall there were some Santo bush people who 
initially declined to accept electoral cards. This was a cause of some concern to 
the French District Agency at Luganville, as these people, to the extent that they 
were followers of Jimmy Stevens and Nagriamel, were potential anti-NP voters.
Mention of Nagriamel reminds me that my close involvement in electoral 
preparations brought about, at some point fairly early in 1975, my one and only 
visit to Vanafo, jointly with M. Jacques Bonhote, a middle-aged FR officer, to 
whom Fabre had delegated some of the detailed electoral work. The purpose 
of the visit was to talk to Jimmy Stevens about the impending constitutional 
changes, and the importance of Nagriamel participation in the elections. 
This was not something that could be taken for granted, despite this movement’s 
links with MANH. Although by this time Stevens was already displaying a 
rather suspicious, not to say hostile, attitude towards the British Administration, 
and was being assiduously courted by the FR, he received my visit cordially 
enough. He doubtless remembered my conversations with him at the BR in 
1967. As Bonhote had little English and no Bislama, being a recent addition to 
the FR staff, I did most of the talking. We left Vanafo feeling reasonably satisfied 
that Stevens would co-operate with the electoral process. I was not to have any 
conversation with Jimmy again until April 1988, when he warmly welcomed me 
to his room at the Base Hospital in Port Vila. He was then serving a long term 
of imprisonment for his role in the failed Vemerama secession attempt in May to 
September 1980, but was in poor health and died three years later.
I shall venture at this point, since he has come into my narrative, to express 
a personal opinion about Jimmy Stevens. I think he was genuinely motivated 
by a wish to prevent further European encroachment on hitherto undeveloped 
(‘dark bush’) land when, circa 1964, he and the bush chief Buluk, formed the 
Nagriamel movement. Although I accept that I could have been misled, because 
of his plausible charm, I was impressed by his apparent sincerity when he 
explained the aims of Nagriamel during talks in my office in 1968. Money was 
his Achilles heel, however, and his desire to acquire it, having been poor all 
his life, made him vulnerable to exploitation by people wanting to use him for 
their own ends—financial and political. Thus, for two or three years, beginning 
in 1968 or 1969, he came under the influence of the shrewd New Caledonian 
businessman, André Leconte. The latter, desirous of obtaining a large tract 
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of land in south-east Santo for cattle-ranching, persuaded Stevens to accept 
a deal, which was ostensibly to the mutual benefit of Stevens, his Melanesian 
followers, and Leconte himself. As I remember it, from the contract that Stevens 
showed me, Leconte would make his mechanical equipment, bulldozers and 
trucks, available to the Vanafo people for the clearing of their land, in return 
for their leasing some 700 hectares to him. I think the ratio was two hectares 
for one hour of bulldozer, and one hectare for an hour of truck use. En passant, 
it should be noted that most or all of the land to be acquired by Leconte had 
been adjudicated in 1951 by the Joint Court in favour of SFNH, although the 
Company’s ownership was not, of course, recognised by Stevens and Buluk. I 
advised Stevens against proceeding with this deal, pointing out that the number 
of hours for which they would have the use of Leconte’s machinery might not be 
sufficient to clear very much of their land. I asked the Australian lawyer, Harry 
Wilshire-Webb, to speak to Stevens, and he also advised against implementing 
the contract. As far as I know, nothing came of it, but Leconte continued to 
court Stevens for some time, paying for him to visit Noumea, where he was 
lavishly wined and dined.
By the early 1970s Jimmy Stevens (now often known as Moli, the Santo title of a 
chief) seemed to have lost sight of the original aims of Nagriamel as a movement 
of protest against the alienation of land by Europeans. After Leconte, Stevens 
came under the influence of the American land speculator, Harold Peacock, who 
presumably saw personal advantage, where his business affairs were concerned, 
in having Nagriamel on his side. Disastrously, as it proved in the long run for 
him, the Nagriamel leader also became deeply involved with Michael Oliver and 
the libertarian members of the Phoenix Foundation.17
By the middle of the 1970s, moreover, the FR, which in the 1960s had seen 
Stevens as something of a bogeyman threatening French economic interests 
on Santo, had come to regard Nagriamel as an essential element of the anti-
NP line-up in the North. I recall being with du Boulay at a meeting with our 
French colleagues in 1975, when Fabre, rather sheepishly, I thought, revealed 
the extent of FR material assistance to the Nagriamel settlement at Vanafo.
Stevens, embittered and disappointed by Nagriamel’s poor result in the Santo 
rural constituency election in 1975, proclaimed that Santo would become 
independent from 1 April 1976 and that the French Administration would 
be permitted to stay on the island, whilst the British would have to quit. It 
was to become increasingly obvious, however, as Stevens took Nagriamel 
out of the mainstream political process into ever closer involvement with the 
Phoenix Foundation in the late 1970s, that the FR had no control over him. He 
17  See M. Parsons, 1981, ‘Phoenix: ashes to ashes,’ New Internationalist Magazine 101 (July), online: http://
newint.org/features/1981/07/01/phoenix/, accessed 20 July 2014.
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had lost touch with reality, which was not, perhaps very surprising, as he was 
manipulated by the Phoenix Foundation and the leaders of MANH who had 
themselves little or no understanding of the basic realities of the Condominium. 
How could, one wonders, either the Phoenix Foundation or MANH have seriously 
believed that Britain and France would allow them to take Santo out of the New 
Hebrides/Vanuatu, against the wishes of at least half, probably the majority, of 
its indigenous population, and turn it into some kind of libertarian paradise?
This may also be the appropriate place to elaborate briefly on the impact of 
constitutional advance on Tanna. After the adoption of a non-repression 
approach towards John Frum in the wake of the 1957 marching and drilling 
episode, the movement was routinely monitored by the District Agents, but 
left to its own devices. For many years, through the 1960s and into the early 
1970s, John Frum posed no threat to public order on Tanna. It could be said, 
I suppose, that the movement withdrew into itself, displaying a negative 
attitude towards education, the 1967 census and local councils. In the mid-
1970s, however, after the radical activities of the NP had led to the creation of 
a conservative opposition—UCNH and MANH—encouraged and supported by 
the FR, a change came about on Tanna. It became the policy of the FR, working 
through the French District Agent, to foster a group-wide and anti-NP alliance, 
composed not only of UCNH and MANH, but also of movements rooted in the 
Melanesian population—Nagriamel and Tabwemasama on Santo and John Frum 
and Kapiel on Tanna.
The establishment of municipal and community 
councils
As has been mentioned above, one of the decisions taken at the London 
Conference of November 1974 was that Municipal Councils should be established 
for the two towns, together with Community Councils in the rural areas.18 The 
establishment of both Municipal and Community Councils was legally provided 
for in Joint Regulation No.1 of 1975, which prescribed a minimum residential 
qualification of one year for participation in elections for those bodies. The RCs 
decided that the Port Vila Municipal Council would be composed of twenty-
four members (twelve New Hebrideans, six British and six French), to be elected 
in five wards returning varying numbers of councillors in proportion to their 
population. Voting would be similar to that prescribed for the RA elections in 
the two towns, that is, cross-voting with electors being required to vote for 
at least one British, one French and one New Hebridean candidate in their 
ward. The Santo (Luganville) Municipal Council was to be composed of sixteen 
18 Woodward, ‘Historical Summary,’ para 12.
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members (nine New Hebrideans, four French and three British), to be elected 
by the town as one electoral unit, there being no wards. It should be noted, in 
view of the subsequent one-sided electoral results—see below—that the BR 
had pressed for a division of the Municipality into two or three wards, but the 
FR had adamantly refused on the grounds that the creation of wards would 
have the effect of further dividing an already divided community. The FR view 
was reluctantly accepted by the BR, on condition that there should be a New 
Hebridean majority on the Council, to take account of the fact that the New 
Hebridean population of Luganville greatly out-numbered the non-native one.
As I have indicated earlier, the purpose of the cross-voting system adopted 
both for the two urban RA constituencies, and for the Port Vila and Luganville 
municipal elections, was to ensure a minimum level of non-native, in practice, 
European, representation on the bodies concerned. I cannot now recall whether 
cross-voting was an original idea of either Fabre or myself, or was—perhaps 
more likely—a system that I had heard about from somewhere or other. 
Another objective, and, I think, of equal importance, was to involve each of 
the three communities—British, French and New Hebridean—in the election 
of the representatives of the other two. To some extent, I suppose, it was our 
conscience salve for requiring a fixed number of European representatives for 
the two towns, because we could say that the British and French candidates 
most liked by the New Hebrideans had the best chance of being elected.
The disgracefully one-sided outcome of the Luganville municipal election, 
which was so unfair to the NP, was so predictable that one must wonder 
whether FR insistence (for a very feeble reason) on having no wards resulted 
from mere ineptitude, or their wish to prevent the NP from being properly 
represented on this council.19 The quality of those elected to the Luganville 
Council was poor, and it would have been less dysfunctional had there been a 
fair level of NP membership.
The elections for both the Port Vila and Luganville Councils were held on 16 
August 1975. In Port Vila, eighteen UCNH and six NP Councillors were elected. 
In Luganville, where there were no wards, fifteen of the Councillors belonged to 
the MANH/Tabwemasana/Nagriamel (MTN) alliance,20 hurriedly created for the 
occasion, and only one to the NP, although the MTN majority was only about 
50 per cent of votes cast. This patently unfair result clearly demonstrated the 
error that had been committed in not dividing the town into wards. As was to 
be shown again in the urban elections for the RA, the cross-voting system tends 
19 Woodward, ‘Historical Summary,’ para 13.
20  These were three very disparate groups with little in common other than their aversion to the NP.
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to give the larger party a much greater number of seats than its actual majority 
in the electorate justifies, unless the town concerned is split into a reasonable 
number of constituencies or wards.
Brief mention must be made here of the creation in mid-1975 of the Tabwemasana 
Party, which was to play a part in the confused events of 1976 out of proportion 
to its numerical importance.21 This small group was essentially composed of 
people living in, or originating from, the large Catholic village of Port Olry on the 
east coast of Santo. Lacking any clearly defined policies, Tabwemasana was even 
more particularist in outlook than Nagriamel and MANH, its approach being 
frankly, ‘Santo for Santo people’. It is convenient to rectify here the omission 
to mention earlier the establishment in 1974 of the Natuitano Party, which—
like Nagriamel and Tabwemasana—placed much emphasis on the importance 
of custom and land but which drew its support from the Presbyterian villages 
scattered around the coast of the island. The Natuitano—which means children 
of the land—Party was closely associated with the NP from the outset and its 
candidates for the Assembly stood under NP colours.
Elections
That it proved possible to hold the first-ever universal suffrage elections in the 
New Hebrides so successfully was due to the hard work and enthusiasm of the 
very many people concerned in various ways. As I have already indicated, great 
credit was due to the teams who covered the New Hebrides, often on foot over 
difficult terrain, registering would-be voters in every village and settlement, no 
matter how remote and difficult of access. Equal credit was due to the people 
who also went to every part of the archipelago to set up the polling stations.
It was not, of course, possible in a country like the New Hebrides, to hold 
the election for the RA everywhere on the same day. There were simply not 
enough suitable people available to man polling stations simultaneously in every 
scattered locality, so voting had to be staggered over several days. To avoid 
the risk (probably only a small one in our political situation) of voters being 
influenced in their choice by knowledge of voting that had already occurred, 
the counting of votes did not take place until the sealed ballot-boxes from all 
the polling stations had been assembled at constituency headquarters, and all 
voting had ended.
The political parties were entitled to have observers at the polling stations to 
ensure that no irregularities occurred. In fact, I only heard of one report by a 
party election observer of attempted electoral fraud. A NP observer at a polling 
21 Woodward, ‘Historical Summary,’ para 14.
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station in the Santo rural constituency detected an attempt at impersonation, 
when some Nagriamel supporters, whom the vigilant observer had noticed 
voting once already, returned to the polling station, and tried to vote with 
another person’s electoral card. I am sure this was an isolated incident, and that 
the people of the New Hebrides could feel justly proud of the way in which they 
had exercised their newly-acquired democratic rights, especially as there was 
such a high turn-out—at least 83 per cent.
Quite a lot of special joint legislation governing the conduct of the elections 
had to be brought into force in 1975, and usually as quickly as possible. I was 
fortunate in that once it had been agreed with our French colleagues what should 
be put in the various pieces of legislation, which was generally not difficult, I 
could turn to Paul Threadwell Q.C., the BR’s Attorney-General, and ask him 
to do the necessary legal drafting. He was always very helpful and willing to 
give my work priority. It was a considerable advantage to have this electoral 
legislation initiated by a good legal draftsman on the British side. The FR did 
not have an equivalent to Threadwell, and since Jacques Fabre was always over-
worked, there would have been more delay in bringing out legislation if we 
had had to wait for it to be originated by the FR. Then I would have had to 
translate it, and hope that it would not be too difficult for Paul Threadwell to 
produce a satisfactory English text, once we were happy about the substance. 
It so happened that Mr. Gordon Norris, an Administrative Officer who had 
joined the BR from Malaysia in 1970, carried out periods of duty as British 
District Agent in a relieving capacity in three of the four districts during 1975, 
beginning with CD1 and going on to Central District No. 2 (Malekula, Ambrym, 
Pentecost and Paama) (CD2), and ending the last few months of the year in 
Northern District (Santo, Ambae, Maevo, Banks and Torres) (ND).
I have always said, and this with all due respect to the abilities of the substantive 
occupants of the districts concerned, that it was fortunate, where the organisation 
of the registration of electors was concerned that Norris spent some time in CD2 
and ND during the middle and latter part of 1975. He had a considerable talent 
for detailed organisational work and he judged, rightly, that preparation of the 
elections should be his first priority, while he was in those districts, rather than 
normal administrative work. Another valuable contribution made by Norris to 
the efficient conduct of the elections was the drawing up of detailed instructions 
for Polling Officers. His grasp of detail enabled him to make these instructions a 
model of comprehensiveness and clarity.
Elections for the first RA were held during the first half of November 1975.22 
These included not only the polling—spaced over a week or more in some parts 
of the Group—for the twenty-nine universal suffrage seats, but also those for 
22 Woodward, ‘Historical Summary,’ para 15.
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the six members representing the Chamber of Commerce section of Economic 
Interests and the three New Hebrideans representing the Co-operative Societies. 
However, of the four Chiefs provided for in the Exchange of Notes of 29 August 
1975, only two were elected during this period, for CD1 and CD2. In the case 
of the latter district, the election of Chief Willie Bongmatur of North Ambrym 
was disputed. The District Agents for the Northern and Southern Districts had 
not been able to constitute the Electoral Colleges for their districts. In the ND 
this failure was due in part to the burden of having to arrange the elections for 
the Luganville Municipal area and then the RA in quick succession, but partly 
also to the differences of view between the District Agents as to the manner in 
which the Electoral College should be constituted. In the Southern District (SD) 
the lack of any clearly defined system of chieftainship on the principal island of 
Tanna was the major obstacle to the rapid establishment of the chiefly Electoral 
College, but here also political factors were present. Whilst it had originally been 
hoped, probably by both the New Hebrideans and by the Government, that the 
election of chiefs would not be a political matter, the general political situation 
had evolved so rapidly between January and November 1975, that politicisation 
of the chiefly elections had become more or less inevitable by the latter date. 
It must regretfully be acknowledged that realisation of the effects that the results 
of the chiefly elections might have had on the general political balance in the RA 
influenced the attitudes and actions of some district agents during this period.
The realisation of the possible political importance of the two chiefly elections 
remaining to be held was greatly heightened when the results of the universal 
suffrage and other elections for the RA were assessed by the politicians.23 Of the 
twenty-nine universal suffrage seats, seventeen were won by the NP—a success 
which even its most optimistic supporters had hardly considered possible—
ten were captured by UCNH and the remaining two by Nagriamel/MANH. 
Since the two Chiefs already elected to represent CD1 and CD2 were known 
NP supporters, and two of the three Co-operatives’ representatives belonged 
to that party, it became obvious that the question as to whether or not the NP 
would have a majority of one or even two seats in the Assembly depended on 
the results of the chiefly elections to be held in the SD and ND.
The results of the elections for the RA came as a shock to the FR, as they did of 
course, to the opponents of the NP. They had expected the NP to be in a minority 
of one seat only in both the Santo rural and the Luganville constituencies. 
Instead, Walter Lini’s party had won four of the six Santo seats. The alarm that 
the results created in the FR was so great that the FRC (M. Robert Gauger, who 
had succeeded Langlois earlier in the year) hurried down to discuss the situation 
with his British colleague. The latter, Mr. John Champion, had succeeded du 
Boulay just a few weeks earlier, and thus had very little time to become properly 
23 Woodward, ‘Historical Summary,’ para 16.
A Political Memoir of the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides 
53
acquainted with the politics of the Condominium. Like du Boulay, Champion 
had begun his career in the Colonial Service, but had transferred to the Foreign 
Service in the 1960s. He was a man of considerable ability and charm, but lacked 
the toughness that had stood his predecessor in good stead in dealing with 
French colleagues intent on pursuing their own political agenda.
The purpose of Gauger’s urgent meeting with his new British counterpart was 
to discuss the situation created by the NP’s unexpected measure of success, and 
what could be done to minimise its political consequences, if possible. Champion 
told me afterwards that Gauger was looking for some way of preventing the NP 
from obtaining an overall majority in the Assembly. It was my impression that 
the FRC’s approach had brought Champion up against the sordid realities of 
the Condominium with something of a shock. He had, of course, no solution 
to offer to his worried colleague. I regret to have to record that from this point 
onwards, the FR devoted much energy to finding a way, or ways, of preventing 
the NP from obtaining even the most slender majority in the Assembly. 
This would be done on two levels. The best efforts of the French District Agents 
in the SD and ND would be directed to ensuring that the chiefly electoral colleges 
of these districts had anti-NP majorities. As will be evident in the following 
pages, the inability of the British and French District Agents in the ND to submit 
to the RCs agreed recommendations for the composition of the chiefly electoral 
colleges for their district was to delay the first meeting of the fully-constituted 
RA until almost the end of 1976. There was much less delay in the submission of 
jointly agreed recommendations for the SD electoral college, which occurred in 
February 1976, probably because the French District Agent, M. André Pouillet, 
with his eight years of experience on Tanna, was able to exert greater influence 
on the composition of the college than his British colleague. The latter was on a 
brief posting to the district, and had no previous direct knowledge of it, having 
been taken out of the Secretariat to spend the first few months of 1976 on Tanna 
because no one with experience in SD was available. This is not to say, however, 
that the composition of the electoral college would have been much different 
had, say, Gordon Norris, been British District Agent of the SD at the time, given 
that NP supporters were in the minority among traditional leaders on Tanna. I 
certainly was not sorry that the chief elected to represent the Southern District 
was not a NP man, given that the party won the other three Districts.
The success of the Natuitano Party in winning all three seats in the Santo urban, 
or Luganville constituency, and two of the three in Santo rural, came as a very 
disagreeable surprise to both the French opposing the MTN alliance and to 
the FR. The latter was convinced that Natuitano/NP had achieved this success 
through electoral fraud, especially by the registration of under-age voters and 
by moving NP supporters into Luganville shortly before the elections, so as to 
boost their voting strength in the urban constituency
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The electoral legislation brought into force in 1975 provided for the 
establishment of an electoral commission, and for the submission to it of 
petitions if disputes arose over the results of elections. The FR, however, could 
have had little confidence in the ability of the MTN alliance in Santo to prepare 
the evidence required to support electoral petitions challenging the election of 
five Natuitano/NP Assembly Members for the two Santo constituencies. The 
French District Agency at Luganville had its work cut out to keep the fragile 
electoral alliance together, and there were few, if any, well-educated people 
in MANH, the only component with a European membership. There is strong 
circumstantial evidence that the French Administration at the very least helped 
in the preparation of the MTN’s electoral petitions, because a FR official removed 
various electoral registration lists from the Condominium Electoral Offices 
in Port Vila. Detailed study of the relevant lists of electors would have been 
essential to the preparation of electoral petitions challenging the Natuitano/NP 
wins in the two Santo constituencies.
I departed from Port Vila in December 1975 for three months leave in England. 
I was allowed to take this leave before reaching the end of a normal two-year 
tour of duty, in view of the intensity of the work I had been engaged in during 
the preceding year.
Bringing the Representative Assembly into 
existence
At this point in the account of constitutional and political events in the New 
Hebrides, I am obliged to rely, in describing what happened in 1976, on the 
relevant paragraphs of my Historical Summary.24 This is because I have no 
detailed memory of my personal involvement in the protracted negotiations, 
both inter-Residency, and with the political parties, which are summarised in 
the following paragraphs. This was probably due to my inability to exercise any 
significant personal influence on the course of events, although it was not for the 
want of trying. The year 1976 was frustrating for me, and no doubt for everybody 
else who had worked hard in 1975 to bring the RA into existence, only to see 
its first meeting endlessly delayed by political manoeuvring. This unhappy 
situation came about, essentially, because the NP had done so unexpectedly 
well in the elections, and for its opponents some way had to be found to prevent 
it having an overall majority in the RA. Henceforth, the political scene was to 
be dominated by the conflict between the NP and its various opponents, not the 
24  Woodward, ‘Historical Summary.’
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least of which was the French Administration. The BR, having no political axe 
to grind, but anxious to see the Assembly functioning as soon as possible, did 
its best to play the part of an honest broker.
The Nagriamel/MANH group was deeply disappointed by the results of the RA 
elections, particularly in the island of Santo, where they obtained only one seat 
instead of the majority, which they expected.25 The leaders of this group filed 
petitions against the elections of the NP members for both the Santo rural and 
Luganville constituencies. In the first half of December, Nagriamel staged two 
large demonstrations in Luganville in support of these electoral petitions. The 
American land speculator, Eugene Peacock gave Jimmy Stevens considerable 
help in transporting Nagriamel members, both from other islands to Luganville 
and from points inland on Santo to that town, for the second and larger of these 
demonstrations.
On 27 December 1975, a third and even larger Nagriamel/MANH demonstration 
was held in Luganville. On this occasion, Stevens presented to the public 
two documents formally proclaiming the immediate independence of the 
newly-named Nagriamel Federation (NGF), the territorial area of which would 
comprise the island of Santo (excluding the town of Luganville) together with 
nearby islands, including Ambae and Maevo and the Banks and Torres Group. 
These proclamations were signed by Jimmy Moli Stevens in his capacity as 
President of the NGF on behalf of the Federation’s ‘Upper Council’. A third 
document, also signed by Aimé Maleré, the President of MANH, summoned the 
British Administration to leave Santo by 1 April 1976, since it had contributed 
nothing to the development of the island and was considered to be hostile to 
its further progress, whilst the French would be permitted to remain subject 
to conditions to be defined later. The British Administration was requested, 
moreover, to arrange for Condominium Services to be transferred to the French. 
On 29 December, however, Stevens requested the RCs to consider the documents 
proclaiming the immediate independence of the NGF to be replaced by a new 
declaration. This document, which was signed only by Stevens, although it 
purported to have been drawn up in agreement with MANH, stated that the 
island of Santo, including Luganville, together with any other islands wishing 
to join it, would become independent from 1 April 1976, on which date the 
NGF would regard the Anglo-French Protocol of 1914 as having ceased to be 
operative. As in the earlier document signed by both Stevens and Maleré, this 
new declaration required the British Administration to quit Santo on 1 April, 
the French being permitted to remain, as envisaged before. Apart from the three 
months postponement of the coming into force of the Nagriamel declaration of 
25 Woodward, ‘Historical Summary,’ para 17, followed by paras 18 and 20–28. These paragraphs are 
presented in this section of the book.
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independence and the fact that Luganville would also be covered by it, the main 
other difference was that the islands of Ambae, Maevo and the Banks and Torres 
Group were not specifically included in the area to become independent.
Whilst the two documents of 27 December proclaiming the immediate 
independence of the NGF were recognisably inspired by either Peacock or 
Oliver, the two documents issued on behalf of both MANH and Nagriamel, in 
which the British Administration was required to leave Santo by 1 April, may 
have owed more to the influence of anti-British elements amongst the French 
population of Santo than to the two Americans, although neither Peacock nor 
Oliver had any reason to like the British Administration. Bearing in mind that 
Peacock had already left the New Hebrides on 19 December and Oliver on 25 
December, it is possible that by 29 December MANH’s influence over Stevens 
had to some extent replaced that of the absent Americans and that the significant 
changes in the Nagriamel independence programme were due to this factor. 
Be this as it may, American influence on Nagriamel subsequently declined 
(neither Peacock nor Oliver being permitted to return to the New Hebrides) and 
was gradually replaced by the influence of the FR, although this did not again 
become effective (and possibly to a lesser extent than in 1974–75) until several 
months had elapsed.
On 31 December 1975, the RCs reacted to the Nagriamel bombshell by issuing 
a communiqué which rejected the right of any one political party to speak for 
all or any part of the New Hebrides, and pointed out that for either of the two 
powers to relinquish its responsibilities for the whole or any part of the Group 
would be in conflict with the Protocol. They also affirmed that the question 
of independence was one for decision by the Metropolitan Governments in 
consultation with local political leaders, especially the members of the RA. For 
the RCs, the next few months were to be dominated by two main preoccupations: 
one was the need to prevent Nagriamel secession and to bring Stevens and his 
followers back into the normal political arena (and, if possible, Stevens himself 
into the Assembly); the other was to find a way of completing the election of 
chiefs to the RA on a basis which would be satisfactory to the political parties.
It will be recalled that only two of the four chiefs had been elected in November 
1975 and that a bitter political dispute had arisen over the election of one of 
these, Chief Willie Bongmatur of North Ambrym. The RCs had originally hoped 
that the new Assembly would be able to hold its first meeting not later than 
early December 1975 and that, after having got through such preliminaries as 
the adoption of Standing Orders and the election of committees, it would shortly 
afterwards be in a position to undertake consideration of the 1976 Condominium 
Budget. These hopes were dashed by the non-election of the chiefs for ND and 
SD and, leaving aside the possibility that until these chiefs had been elected the 
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Assembly might not be legally properly constituted, the fact that neither the NP 
nor UCNH were willing to sit down in the Assembly until all its members had 
been chosen.
It has been mentioned earlier that disagreement between the District Agents 
concerned as to the manner in which the ND and SD Chiefly Electoral Colleges 
were to be constituted had been one of the causes of the delay in the election of 
chiefs to represent the Districts in the Assembly. The Exchange of Notes of 29 
August 1975 had not attempted to lay down precise rules for the composition 
of the Electoral Colleges; it simply required the District Agents in each District 
to make recommendations to the RCs who would then appoint the members of 
each College by Joint Decision. This lack of detailed provisions was not due 
to an oversight, but rather to the fact that the structure of Melanesian society 
differed from District to District and from island to island, with the result that 
there was no uniform system of chiefly authority and that no precise rules as to 
the manner of setting up the Electoral Colleges would be valid for each District. 
Nevertheless, the proposition can be fairly advanced that, if the representation 
of the chiefs in the Assembly had not become such a politicised matter, the 
setting up of adequately representative Electoral Colleges for each District would 
not have presented a major problem. This view is supported by the fact that the 
District Agents for CD1 and CD2, acting in concert with leading New Hebridean 
personalities (especially men who were recognised to be chiefs or to possess 
equivalent authority), had been able to submit to the RCs agreed proposals for 
the composition of their respective Electoral Colleges which were generally 
acceptable in mid-1975, before it was realised that the political composition of 
the Chiefly Section of the Assembly would be such a crucial matter.
In the first half of December 1975, the RCs held consultations with members of 
UCNH and other local politicians (but the NP refused to take part) in an attempt 
to obtain political agreement as to the manner in which the two remaining 
chiefly Electoral Colleges should be chosen. Following these consultations, 
fairly detailed instructions were sent to the District Agents in the districts 
concerned requesting them to undertake an elaborate process of consulting 
people, especially those with knowledge of custom, in the various parts of their 
districts with a view to the submission of generally accepted names for the 
appointment of the outstanding Electoral Colleges. The District Agents had not 
been able to embark on the consultations, however, when the crisis precipitated 
by the Nagriamel declaration of independence broke at the end of the year. The 
task of completing the Chiefly Section of the Assembly soon became complicated 
by considerations arising from the threat of Nagriamel secession. Preoccupied 
with the need to find a way of bringing Stevens into the Assembly and realising 
that the chances of his being elected as the chief to represent ND were virtually 
non-existent, the RCs proposed that the number of chiefs should be increased 
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from four to eight, a measure which could be expected to enable the political 
minorities in each district to be represented in the Assembly by chiefs of their 
own persuasion. This proposal was submitted to the political parties, including 
the NP, by the French High Commissioner in February 1976 and first reactions 
to it appeared to be not unfavourable. However, despite efforts made by the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the French DOM/TOM (the Ministry 
dealing with New Hebrides affairs) during visits made by Father Walter Lini 
and Pastor Fred Timakata—respectively the President and Vice-President 
of the NP—to London and Paris in March 1976, the NP decisively rejected 
the proposal to increase the number of chiefs and on 27 March 1976, staged 
demonstrations in each of the main centres in the New Hebrides demanding 
the early constitution of the Assembly on the basis of the 1975 Exchange of 
Notes. Of these demonstrations, the one held in Luganville was marred by an 
unprovoked attack on the peacefully marching demonstrators by members of the 
Tabwemasana Party—an incident which considerably increased the bitterness 
of New Hebridean politics.
Although the approach of 1 April, the date fixed three months earlier by 
Nagriamel and MANH for the independence of Santo caused considerable 
apprehension among non-Nagriamel inhabitants of Luganville and the rural 
areas of Santo, the day itself passed off without incident. In the event, Stevens 
contented himself with sending a deputation of Nagriamel chiefs to deliver a 
document to the District Agents at Luganville in which it was stated that the 
date of independence for Santo had been postponed until 10 August, the day 
of the traditional annual Nagriamel celebrations at Vanafo. This change of plan 
can probably be ascribed to the precautions taken by the Joint Administration, 
including the sending of British and French police reinforcements to Santo in 
order to prevent any move by Nagriamel against Luganville for the purpose 
of marking the independence of the island. The step backwards may have 
been due, it must be admitted, as much to the threat of an attack on Vanafo 
by Tabwemasana (made known a few days earlier) as to prudence resulting 
from the preparations by the Government. Indeed by 1 April 1976, Stevens 
and Nagriamel were without allies on Santo since by that time their previously 
staunch partner, MANH, had formally dissociated itself from the intended 
secession. During the next few months the line taken by Stevens and Radio 
Vanafo (the illegal transmitter given to him by the American, Michael Oliver) 
was isolationist: Nagriamel wanted nothing to do with the Condominium and, 
in particular, regarded the RA as entirely irrelevant to its needs.
In the meantime, efforts continued in Port Vila to resolve the problem of the 
representation of chiefs in the RA. Following a meeting between the RCs and 
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NP leaders on 12 April, it was provisionally agreed—subject to the approval of 
the Metropolitan Governments—that a meeting of RA members, on an informal 
basis not constituting an official session of the Assembly, would be held on 
29 April in order to find a solution to the problem. In the event, however, the 
NP boycotted this meeting, on the grounds that the two Governments had not 
indicated their agreement to it by the 20 April deadline previously set by the 
party for a decision on the issue of chiefly representation. The meeting of 29 
April was attended by the UCNH/MANH members of the Assembly and the 
representatives of Economic Interests (Chamber of Commerce), together with 
a number of custom chiefs in the capacity of observers, the latter having been 
invited by UCNH before obtaining the RCs’ consent. This meeting resulted in 
the adoption of a motion to the effect that ten chiefs should be elected to the 
RA, one for each of the major islands or groups of islands. The impasse was only 
broken when, following discussions between the British High Commissioner 
(Mr. H. Stanley) and NP leaders during the former’s visit to Port Vila in early June 
1976, the NP agreed to take part in a special meeting of the RA to be convened 
for the sole purpose of discussing the question of chiefly representation. The 
first session of the RA, which met with no chiefs present (it having been agreed 
between the Joint Administration and the political parties that the two chiefs 
already elected should not take part) began on 29 June 1976.
Of the two MANH/Nagriamel members of the RA, one—the local Frenchman, 
Michel Thevenin—only put in a brief appearance at the first session, and then 
only for the purpose of denouncing its proceedings, and the other—Thomas 
Tungu (from Ambae)—did not arrive until the third and last day of the meeting. 
Tungu’s attendance was at variance with Radio Vanafo’s announcement that 
Nagriamel would boycott the Assembly in accordance with its secessionist 
policy of the previous few months. It is not clear to what extent Tungu’s belated 
presence represented an initial, but only partial, success for persistent FR efforts 
to bring MANH/Nagriamel back into the normal political arena.
The principal results of the first session were first, that the adoption by nineteen 
votes to fourteen, with M. Delacroix. M. Bacon and M. René Ah Pow of the 
Economic Interests section abstaining, of a NP motion that there should be only 
four chiefly seats in the Assembly (as already provided for in the Exchange of 
Notes of 29 August 1975) and, second, a laboriously negotiated NP/UCNH joint 
motion, supported by thirty-six of the thirty-seven members present, to the 
effect that a Council of Chiefs should be set up to advise the RA on all matters 
concerning custom. UCNH announced that it would abide by the Assembly’s 
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vote in favour of maintaining the number of chiefly seats in the Assembly at 
four. In view of this decision, it was virtually a foregone conclusion that both 
Metropolitan Governments would confirm the Assembly’s proposal.
The way was not yet clear, however, for the full RA to begin its work. Apart from 
the fact that the chiefs to represent ND and SD had still to be elected (and, in the 
case of ND, the composition of the Electoral College still to be recommended by 
the District Agents to the RCs), by-elections had to be held for the filling of five 
seats vacant in the two Santo constituencies. Early in May 1976, the Electoral 
Disputes Committee (EDC) had declared its decision regarding the petitions and 
counter-petition presented by Nagriamel and the NP in respect of the election 
results in Santo and Port Vila. The Committee rejected the NP petition against 
the election of the six UCNH members for Port Vila and declared invalid the 
election of all three members representing Santo rural, together with one of the 
three members representing Luganville, on the grounds of various irregularities, 
including voting by small numbers of under-age electors. The NP appealed to 
the Joint Court to reverse the EDC’s decision in respect of its unseated Santo 
members, but the Court in judgements delivered in July 1976 upheld the EDC’s 
decision regarding the three Santo rural seats and, furthermore, annulled the 
election of the French NP member for Luganville as well as that of British NP 
member, Mrs. Mary Gilu.
Annulment of Santo elections and by-elections
The decision by the Joint Court26 to uphold the ruling of the EDC with regard to 
the Santo rural seats, but also to annul a second Luganville seat (in addition to the 
one already invalidated by the EDC) was portentous in its political consequences, 
and merits examination here. Mr. Justice (later Sir) Renn Davis came in person 
to my office immediately after the Joint Court appeal sitting to inform me of the 
Court’s judgement, for which he apologised. I do not know whether the apology 
was indicative of misgivings on his part regarding the judgement.
When considering the Joint Court’s ruling on the Luganville election, it should 
be borne in mind that the Joint Court had not, since 1939, been constituted as 
envisaged by the Protocol of 1914 with a President and the British and French 
judges. When the second and last Spanish President, Senor Bosch-Barrett, 
had gone on leave in 1939, the British and French Governments decided that 
the Condominium should be spared the expense of a President of the Joint 
Court, and Bosch-Barrett was not allowed to resume his functions, much to his 
disappointment. He had, like his predecessor, the Conde de Buena Esperanza, 
been appointed by the King of Spain, but by 1939 General Franco was in power, 
26 M. Louis Cazendres, the French judge, and Mr. Justice Dermot Renn Davis, the British judge.
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and this change of regime may also have been a factor in the decision of the 
Metropolitan Governments to dispense with a President of the Joint Court. 
However, this is mere speculation on my part. An Exchange of Diplomatic Notes 
of 1939 between the two Condominium Powers provided for the Joint Court 
to be in future constituted by the British and French Judges, who would sit 
with an Assessor, the latter to have a consultative voice. At some point in the 
1960s, the then British and French judges, Mr. Justice James Trainor and M. Le 
Juge Georges Guesdon, formally pointed out to the RCs the difficulties under 
which they laboured in the absence of a President. They therefore proposed that 
they should be appointed Joint Presidents, and should in consequence receive 
additional remuneration. This proposal was rather reluctantly accepted, despite 
some scepticism on the parts of the RCs, since the Court had apparently functioned 
well enough for more than twenty years without a President. Normally, of 
course, political considerations would not intrude upon the deliberations of the 
Joint Court, but it had not had to adjudicate on an electoral dispute. Given the 
politically charged atmosphere of 1976 in the New Hebrides, I cannot exclude 
the possibility that the two judges disagreed on political lines, and that Judge 
Davis gave way, against his better judgement, to pressure from the French judge, 
where the Luganville election was concerned, so that the Court could reach a 
decision. This, again, is speculation on my part, and—as both men are dead—we 
shall never know how they deliberated in this difficult case.
The by-elections resulting from the Joint Court’s appeal judgements were held at 
the end of October 1976; the NP retained its two Santo Rural seats, but lost one 
of the three seats it had previously held in Luganville, its sole French member 
of the Assembly (Philibert de Montgremier) being ousted by MANH candidate, 
Georges Cronsteadt. Perhaps the most significant feature of the Santo by-
election was the decision by the Nagriamel movement to participate, despite the 
frequently repeated denunciations of the Assembly by Radio Vanafo during the 
first half of 1976 and its proclaimed secessionist policy. This reversal of attitude 
was only brought about after months of unremitting efforts by the French 
Administration and can probably be regarded as a personal triumph for the then 
French District Agent, M. Lefilatre. Moli Stevens, replaced M. Michel Thevenin 
as the movement’s member for Santo Rural. The retention of the NP of its two 
Santo Rural seats, despite the fact that it did not have a majority in the electorate, 
was mainly due to the splitting of the anti-NP vote by the participation in the 
contest of Tabwemassana and Fren Melanesian party candidates, in addition to 
Stevens and Tangis Buluk (see Table 1). Voting figures were:
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Table 1. The retention by the NP of its two Santo Rural seats, despite 
the fact that it did not have a majority in the electorate, was mainly due 
to the splitting of the anti-NP vote by the participation in the contest of 
Tabwemassana and Fren Melanesian party candidates.
Candidate Votes
Thomas Reuben (NP) 1126
Jimmy Stevens (NG) 977
Titus Path (NP) 887
Tangis Buluk (NG) 869
Etienne Poune Narae (Tabwemasana) 462
Albert Ravutia (Fren Melanesian) 275
Source: Author’s compilation.
The participation in the Luganville by-election of a Tabwemassana candidate 
also prevented MANH from gaining the British seat in that constituency, 
although the NP did not have a majority, its voting strength in the town having 
declined slightly since the 1975 General Election.
The fact that the NP lost only one seat in the Luganville by-election, and retained 
the two seats that it had won in the Santo rural constituency indicated that the 
poor showing of its opponents was due more to the inability of the latter to 
present a united front in both the 1975 and 1976 elections than to any electoral 
fraud or sharp practice by the NP. The NP retained its two seats in Santo Rural 
because, unlike the badly organised MTN alliance, its leaders realised that if 
the party fielded three candidates, in what would have been a futile attempt to 
win all three seats, they would risk winning only one, or even none at all. This 
realisation was presumably based on examination of the voting figures for the 
constituency in the 1975 general election, from which they would have deduced 
that Natuitano was not in a majority in the constituency. The MTN had enough 
electoral support to win three seats and would have done so, if it had not put 
up three candidates—or four if Fren Melanesian (FM) regarded itself as an ally 
of MTN—a point that I am not sure about. As it was, the participation of an FM 
candidate made the Natuitano victory even more certain.27
My colleagues in the FR were convinced that the NP/Natuitano deliberately 
moved supporters from other island constituencies into Luganville in the weeks 
preceding the 1975 election, in order to take advantage of the provision in the law 
for late transfer of registration, and by so doing to swell their voting strength in 
Santo Urban. Whether this was the case I do not know, but I very much doubt 
27  A small party, drawing its support in South Santo and North Malekula from the French Protestant sect 
led by Pastor Charlemagne, who lived in New Caledonia. Its candidate in the by-election, Albert Ravutia, was 
to hold office briefly in the first Council of Ministers under George Kalsakau in 1978.
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it. To perform such a piece of electoral engineering, the party would have had 
to balance the possible, but by no means certain, gain to be had in Luganville 
against the risks involved in weakening its voting strength elsewhere, despite 
lacking adequate population data.
Because of his belief that the NP had engineered the Luganville election, my then 
colleague in political matters at the FR, M. Francis Doyen, who had succeeded 
Fabre as Chancelier in 1976, insisted on amending the electoral legislation in 
advance of the Santo by-elections, so as to prevent late transfer of electoral 
registration. It was agreed that there should be a mandatory period of six months’ 
residence for electoral registration, as was the law in France. It was obvious 
to me from Doyen’s rather aggressive attitude when this matter was discussed, 
that the FR was prepared to make a major issue of it. I could not advance any 
strong argument against the six months’ residence requirement, and I did not 
expect the BRC, Mr. John Champion, would wish to quarrel with the FR on the 
point, especially as our principal concern in 1976 was how to expedite the first 
meeting of the then still incomplete RA. As has been mentioned earlier, two of 
the Assembly’s four chiefs had still not been elected, and would not be until 
November of that year.
The loss, in the October 1976 by-elections of one of their three seats in the Santo 
urban constituency by the NP, whilst resulting in a politically more equitable 
representation of Luganville, was to bring about the premature and inglorious 
end of the first RA in February 1977. This was due to the resentment felt by the 
NP in having been deprived, by losing their seat in Luganville, of the majority 
of one which it would otherwise have held in the Assembly. The NP leaders 
could not but unreasonably feel that the structure of the Assembly had been 
weighed against them from the outset. It was significant that one of the party’s 
demands in February 1977 was to be the removal of the Chamber of Commerce 
members from the Assembly, the rejection of which resulted in the NP’s boycott 
of the RA and its subsequent collapse. The inclusion in the RA of these six 
members, officially styled ‘representatives of Economic Interests’, rendered 
nugatory the substantial majority of five seats won by the NP in the universal 
suffrage election.
It was clear to me from Doyen’s attitude during our discussions of the amendment 
to the electoral legislation in preparation for the Santo by-elections, that he 
thought the NP enjoyed the covert support of the BR. He made plain his dislike 
and distrust of that party on many occasions. This attitude on Doyen’s part, 
which no doubt reflected the feelings of the FR in general towards their British 
colleagues, could, I think, in large measure have been due to the curious, and 
unfortunate situation of the BR vis-à-vis the NP.
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Origins and perceptions of the National Party
This situation derives from the NP’s origins, and the composition of its leadership. 
As late as ten years before independence, and apart from a small number of 
Anglican priests and Presbyterian pastors, the largest number of fairly well-
educated New Hebrideans were to be found in the British National Service 
(BNS), of which the BRC was the head. It was not surprising therefore, that the 
founding fathers of the New Hebrides Cultural Association, which began life 
early in 1971, were senior Melanesian members of the BNS. Within a few months, 
the Association became the New Hebrides NP, and had held its first public 
demonstration in support of the Joint Administration’s policy of controlling 
subdivisions, a matter to which I have referred earlier. From the outset, the BR’s 
position was that it should do nothing to inhibit the development of a political 
party by New Hebrideans. I knew that my good friend and colleague the late 
Dick Hutchinson had given some guidance to either Peter Taurakoto or Donald 
Kalpokas,28 perhaps both, who were BR Assistant Education Officers, regarding 
the formation of the Cultural Association. I also remember George Kalkoa (later 
Sokomanu) asking me to look at a draft constitution for the NP. He was then an 
Assistant Administrative Officer in the British Service.
By the mid-1970s, when the NP was growing increasingly insistent in its demand 
for early independence—its stated target for that event being 1977—most but 
not all of the New Hebridean members of the British Service were enthusiastic 
NP supporters, and some of the senior ones were on its committee. The FR and 
the public at large were, of course, well aware of this.
Although, as I have indicated above, individual BR officers, including myself, 
gave a little advice and mild encouragement to various New Hebrideans when 
the NP was being set up, I am in a position to state categorically that at no 
time did the BR exercise any control over, or have improper involvement with 
this party. I often had cause to regret that we had virtually no influence over 
the leadership of the NP, although there were occasions when I tried to take 
advantage of my friendly relations with most of them individually to divert 
them from extreme courses of action. One of these occasions was when I went 
out to Mele to see Ati George Kalkoa in his house, in a fruitless attempt to avert 
the NP demonstrations of 27 December 1973 at the FR, already mentioned in 
these pages. There was another instance in 1977 when I provided cold Fosters 
(beer) in my house to many of the NP leaders in what proved to be a vain hope of 
influencing them towards a more flexible attitude on some matter which I have 
28  R.J.S. Hutchinson served variously as BDA CD1, CD2 and ND between 1956 and 1972. While on Santo, 
he played a big part in bringing to justice Taptapus, Tapun and the thirty-two other Big Bay bush murderers, 
for which he received insufficient recognition. See Hutchinson, 2002, ‘Dick Hutchinson: Administrative 
officer 1956–1972,’ in Tufala Gavman: Reminiscences from the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides, 
ed. B.J. Bresnihan and K. Woodward, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 
pp. 301–26.
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now forgotten. The inescapable fact was that in 1976 and 1977, the NP leadership 
was embittered by the loss of its majority in the first RA, and no longer trusted 
the Joint Administration. The party knew that the FR was working against it, 
and had no confidence that the BR could, or would, do anything for it.
That the general public in the New Hebrides, and particularly the French 
community, saw the relationship between the NP and the BR in quite another 
light was brought home to me in various ways. Early in 1975, after he had 
attended some social function, the then BRC, Roger du Boulay, told me that 
the American manager of a formerly French-owned plantation had remarked 
that he knew me to be ‘the President of the NP’. The formerly very friendly 
relations that I had enjoyed with French planters on Efate cooled noticeably, 
and I was never invited by M. Gauger (FRC 1975–77) to any FR social function 
other than the Quatorze Juillet (July 14th) cocktail party attended by le tout 
Port-Vila (all of Port Vila). In 1980, after I had left the New Hebrides, a French 
woman (a cousin of the well-known businessman, Pierre Bougeois) said to 
me in a very friendly way, ‘Je sais que vous avez fondé le Vanuaku Party (VP)’ 
(I know that you founded the Vanuaku Party).29 These words were spoken to 
me, in a very friendly manner by Martine Rundle, who had married an old 
school fellow of mine, at the time Merchandise Manager at Burns Philp & Co, 
Port Vila. Martine said this to me on an audio-cassette. I did not know her while 
I was living in Port Vila and she perhaps arrived there after my departure. That 
she should have thought I had founded the NP/VP revealed the reputation that I 
had apparently acquired in the French community. The words also showed that 
many Europeans did not credit New Hebrideans with the ability, unaided by 
white men, to create and run efficiently, a political party like the NP/VP.
There was, unfortunately, a tendency in the FR to judge their British colleagues, 
especially where politics were concerned, by their own standard of behaviour. 
We studiously refrained from any involvement on behalf of the NP during 
the 1975 electoral campaign. As I have stated earlier, I merely made sure that 
Kalkot Matas Kele-Kele understood how his party could get maximum advantage 
from the electoral system that I had originated. He was too intelligent to need 
telling twice. I would have been very happy to provide UCNH with the same 
information, but I assumed, quite rightly, that the FR would do that and more. In 
fact, the FR’s support of the so called Moderates (les modérés) before the election 
was quite blatant. I recall there were even allegations that French District Agents 
were offering some New Hebridean villages material inducement to vote for the 
Moderates. The French District Agents tried hard, moreover, but without great 
success to weld the disparate components of the MTN alliance on Santo into an 
effective opposition to the NP. I suspected that my friend, André Pouillet (French 
District Agent, SD 1967–77) did much towards getting John Frum to ally itself 
29  The National Party became the Vanu’aku Pati in 1977.
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with UCNH, although the movement had no reason to side with the NP, which 
it associated with the Presbyterians. In short, the Condominium and with it the 
entente cordiale in the New Hebrides, were not at their best in the mid-1970s.
Distinguishing British and French attitudes and 
motives
This remaining section of my Condominium memoirs will be different from what 
has gone before. This is so because, as I have already mentioned, I was able to 
exercise much less, indeed very little, influence on political and constitutional 
events during the period 1976–77 than during the years leading up to the 
Assembly elections of 1975. It is, I think, not too much of an exaggeration 
to say that the actions of the political parties largely determined the course 
of events, as described in my Historical Summary,30 during this period, and 
beyond. The British and French Governments found themselves reacting to 
what the parties were doing. Thus, the hopes of the two Governments, that 
the 1975 elections would be the first stage in a gradual and orderly progress 
towards self-government, and ultimate independence, were thwarted over 
the issue of the election of two chiefs to the RA. Moreover, the resentment of 
the NP over the loss of its majority, following the 1976 Santo by-elections, in 
the Assembly led to its boycott, and wrecking of it. The party then followed 
an increasingly hard line, boycotting the second Assembly, setting up its so-
called People’s Provisional Government, and not coming in from the cold until 
the second half of 1978, after I had left the New Hebrides. Only then could 
planned constitutional and political progress be resumed, with the VP and Tan-
Union working in collaboration with the British and French Governments. This 
progress did not remain orderly, however, after the parliamentary elections of 
1979, owing to the attempted secession of Vemerana in May–July 1980, but that 
event lies beyond the scope of this story.
It may help the reader to understand the events of 1976–77 if I try to analyse the 
attitudes and motives of the various players, the British and French Governments 
and the political parties, as I saw them at the time, and with the benefit of 
information that I have acquired since.
British
British Government policy with regard to the Condominium was similar to the 
one pursued in the other Pacific dependant territories, such as the Solomon 
30  Woodward, ‘Historical Summary.’
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Islands and the Gilbert and Ellis Islands, to bring them to self-government 
and, if they wanted it, independence, by progressive stages. I was asked—in 
1962 or 1963—by Sir Michael Gass, then Chief Secretary to the Western Pacific 
High Commission, to submit my ideas about constitutional advance in the New 
Hebrides. I clearly recall expressing the view that it was desirable for colonial 
administrations to institute the process of constitutional advance somewhat 
ahead of any pressure for it from the people of the territory concerned. I felt, and 
I do not claim any originality for this idea, that it was preferable to anticipate 
demand for advance, rather than wait until pressure built up for it, and then, 
perhaps, be obliged to concede too much too quickly.
In the event, as I have related earlier, the opposition of the French Government, 
until 1974, to any constitutional change more advanced than the introduction 
of indirectly elected members to AdCo thwarted the kind of forward-looking 
policy that I had advocated in the early 1960s. Whether, if we had been able, for 
example, to set up an elected legislature by 1970, we could have cut the ground 
from under the feet of Walter Lini, Barak Sope and the other more radical 
NHNP leaders, one cannot say for sure. However, I feel that the path towards 
independence could have been smoother, with much less acrimony between 
New Hebrideans, if a legislative body, based at least in part, on direct elections, 
had been set up (as was suggested by the British Government, but refused by 
Paris) by 1970 or 1971.
In venturing this opinion I have a number of factors in mind. One is the fact 
that, in 1970, the year in which Fiji achieved independence, the Condominium 
was the only colonial territory in the South Pacific, British or French, not to 
have some form of elected legislature. New Hebrideans, many of whom by this 
time had transistor radios, knew what was going on elsewhere in the region, 
and realised that the Condominium was lagging behind. Another point worth 
mentioning is that, although anglophone New Hebrideans were the first to set 
up a political party, the New Hebrides NP, in 1971, there were francophones 
who also aspired to constitutional advance.
Bearing in mind the points mentioned in the preceding paragraph, I suggest 
that the history of the last ten years of the Condominium might have been very 
different if an elected legislature had been set up in 1970 or 1971. Had this 
been done, that is, had the French Government agreed to do no more in the 
New Hebrides than it had done already in New Caledonia and French Polynesia, 
politically-awakening New Hebrideans whether francophone or anglophone, 
would have had the means of fulfilling their legitimate desire to take a hand 
in the running of their country. There was, I think, at least a possibility that 
anglophones and francophones could have worked amicably together towards 
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self-government,31 and ultimate independence, by progressive stages, on a 
reasonable time-scale of ten to twelve years. Fifteen would have been preferable, 
but hardly likely, given that all the former British territories in the South Pacific 
had attained independence by 1980 or before. There was at least the chance that 
the NP would not have begun—as it unfortunately did—calling, in 1973/74, for 
independence by 1977, had its leaders been shown that both Britain and France 
were willing to give New Hebrideans their say in the process of government.
I do not, however, wish to overstate this line of argument. That Walter Lini 
was already, by 1974, demanding very early independence was, I am almost 
certain, due to the young NP (founded only three years earlier, in 1971) having 
come under external influences. These external influences, such as SPADES 
would have existed in any case.32 Leaving speculation aside, it is clear to me 
that such hope as may have existed in the very early 1970s that anglophones 
and francophones would not become politically polarised was dashed by the 
premature radicalisation of the NP, and especially the call for independence in 
1977, which alienated the francophones.
SPADES was by no means the only external influence on the NP. The party was 
in touch with the Black Power movement in the United States, and with the 
United Nations Committee of Twenty-four, which monitors progress towards 
decolonisation in the remaining dependent territories, exerting pressure on 
the colonial nations to speed up the process.33 The slow rate of constitutional 
advance in the New Hebrides made the Condominium an obvious target for 
the Committee. The British Government had traditionally shown itself to be 
sensitive to its pressure, France much less so.
I have somewhat digressed from the subject of the British Government’s policy 
towards the New Hebrides. A complicating factor in our relations with the 
FR during most of the 1970s was the fact that many, if not most, of the New 
Hebridean personnel of the British New Hebrides Service were members of the 
NP, including some of its leading ones.
31  The term francophones should be taken to include various groups or movements of New Hebrideans, 
such as John Frum and Nagriamel, who were not French-educated, and who were later included with the 
francophones under the collective term of Modérés or Moderates.
32  South Pacific Action for Development Strategy (SPADES). This organisation, which may have originated 
in Fiji, although essentially political, operated under a cloak of Christianity, and its promoters certainly 
included some irresponsible, radical, church leaders, including both Europeans and Pacific islanders. Under 
the mistaken impression that SPADES was primarily a religious organisation, the BR allowed it to hold a 
meeting on the British Paddock in 1973, and was subsequently unpleasantly surprised and embarrassed by 
the highly political nature of the message the speakers had put across. This episode strengthened our French 
colleagues’ suspicion that we in the BR were at best too complacent about the NP’s activities, or at worst, 
supportive of them.
33  In the mid-1970s, the UN Committee of Twenty-four was asking Britain to report progress towards 
independence for Pitcairn Island! I do not know what response it got from London.
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It was the policy of the BR not to prohibit its New Hebridean employees from 
joining political parties. It seemed preferable to regard membership of the NP, 
and a reasonable degree of political activity, as normal, rather than to make our 
staff feel, by dint of prohibition, that we were hostile to party membership and 
political activity. By 1976–77, however, the BR saw that the time had come to 
review its policy in this matter. We felt that things were going too far when John 
Naupa, one of our Executive Officers, took part in an attempt by NP radicals 
to prevent the deportation of the Black Power activist, Roosevelt Brown, by 
going to Bauerfield Airport with the intention of physically impeding Brown 
from being put on an Air Pacific aircraft. We had got wind of this plan, and the 
NP coup de main (helping hand) was foiled by the adoption of my suggestion 
that the chartered Air Melanesie plane bringing Brown under British Police 
escort from Ambae should wait at the far end of the runway to allow him to be 
transferred to the Air Pacific plane when it turned for takeoff. By this means, 
any serious disorder at the Bauerfield Terminal was averted, although Naupa 
and others were arrested, and held briefly.
In 1977, the Melanesian personnel of the BR ceased to be permanent and 
pensionable, and were given contracts. This change was made in the knowledge 
that, with independence approaching the British Service would only continue 
for a few more years. At the same time, the opportunity was taken to present 
those who were the most active NP supporters with the option of resigning 
from the British Service to become more or less full-time politicians, it being 
understood that they would have to abandon political activism if they wished 
to remain in our employment. George Kalkoa was one of those who then left 
the British Service. Another was our most senior New Hebridean police officer, 
George Kalsakau. He had been a personal friend since my earliest days in Port 
Vila, when he had just joined the British Police. So I was rather sad when it fell 
to me to tell him that he would have to resign if he wished to carry on as one of 
the principal leaders of the recently formed Natotok Efate Party.34 I do not recall 
how many of our New Hebridean staff members left us at this point, but it was 
only a few, I think.
French
It is now time to look at the FR. When talking about French policy towards 
the Condominium, it is important to bear in mind that our colleagues looked 
34  This party, which allied itself with the Modérés, came into being partly in reaction to the NP’s apparent 
attack, later disclaimed, on French education at its mid-1977 congress. Many anglophone New Hebrideans in 
the Port Vila area sent some of their numerous children to French schools, which were free, as they could not 
afford to pay the fees to send all of them to English-medium ones. Natotok also resented people from outer 
islands taking jobs at the expense of Efatese. The party was short-lived, however.
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at the New Hebrides from a viewpoint quite different from that of the British 
Government. This had been the case since the beginning of the Condominium, 
mutatis, mutandis…
There must be a brief sketch of the historical background to the establishment 
of the Condominium by the Anglo-French Convention of 20 October 1906. 
It should be noted, and the point is not merely academic, that the word 
‘Condominium’ does not occur in the Convention. Neither does it appear in 
the amending diplomatic instrument, the Anglo-French Protocol respecting the 
New Hebrides of 6 August 1914 (brought into force in March 1922). Under 
the 1906 Convention, the New Hebrides became ‘a region of joint influence in 
which subjects and citizens of the two Signatory Powers shall enjoy equal rights 
of residence, personal protection, and trade, each of the two Powers retaining 
jurisdiction over its subjects or citizens, and neither exercising a separate control 
over the Group’ (Article 1 of the 1906 Convention).
By this time, the number of French nationals in the New Hebrides was over twice 
that of the British population, and the disproportion gradually increased during 
the early years of the Condominium. There were many more French-owned 
plantations than British, although the influence over the Melanesian people 
exercised by the various Protestant Missions (especially the Presbyterians and 
Anglicans) was much more widespread than that of the Catholic Marist Order, 
which had begun missionary work much later. Most of the Catholic clergy and 
nuns were French, and French was taught in Catholic Mission schools.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, the Compagnie Calédonienne 
des Nouvelles Hébrides, founded by the naturalised French citizen, Higginson, 
and its successor company, SFNH, steadily bought land in the group both 
directly from Melanesians and from British subjects. By the time the negotiations 
began between Britain and France which led to the signature of the Convention, 
at least one-third of the land area of the New Hebrides was under claim of 
ownership by SFNH. Land was a major issue in the negotiations, with the 
French Government striving, successfully, to protect the interests of SFNH and 
the British trying rather ineffectively to ensure that the system of land tenure 
set up by the Convention did not unduly favour European claimants at the 
expense of the Melanesians.
It is probable that France regarded the Condominium as an arrangement of a 
temporary nature, and it may well have hoped, given the increase in French 
settlement and economic influence, that Britain, which had little direct interest 
in the New Hebrides, would sooner or later be agreeable to the French acquiring 
sole control over the group. This was not an unreasonable expectation, since 
Britain might well have been prepared to agree to French annexation when the 
question was raised by France in 1885, but for the strong opposition of the 
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Australian colonies. Il n’y a que le provisoire qui dure (Only what is provisional 
endures). History was to bear out this French maxim. Although various possible 
alternatives to the continuation of the Condominium were aired during the years 
immediately following World War I, none was considered feasible. The future 
status of the New Hebrides was settled when Britain and France at last brought 
the 1914 Protocol into force in March 1922.35 The Condominium survived the 
strains and stresses of World War II, helped by the fact that the French community 
in the New Hebrides, under the leadership of the FRC, M. Henri Sautot, wisely 
decided, in July 1940, to rally to General de Gaulle and Free France, before 
any of the French colonial territories took this step. There was some desultory 
discussion between the British and Australian Governments beginning in the 
mid-1950s of the possible take-over by Canberra of Britain’s responsibilities in 
the New Hebrides, but Australia had its hands full in Papua New Guinea, and 
must have seen little to be gained in acquiring such an unrewarding burden 
as partnership with France in the Condominium. Anyway, nothing came of it, 
or was ever likely to. For my part, when I was apprised confidentially of these 
discussions by the Australian Consul (Dr. Cumpston) when I called on him in 
Nouméa in 1956, it seemed very unlikely to me that the French would be willing 
to countenance such a momentous change. Realising that, even if my Resident 
Commissioner, Mr. (later Sir) John Rennie was privy to the Canberra-London 
exchanges of views (which I have subsequently learned was the case), he would 
not want me to be in the know, I subsequently said nothing to anyone upon my 
return to Port Vila! After all, I was very junior in the BR in those far-off days.
Having written about early French policy towards the New Hebrides, albeit with 
some degree of digression, I now turn to French policy in the last two decades of 
the Condominium’s existence, the 1960s and 1970s. We are fortunate in having 
at our disposal a clear exposition of that policy by M. Jacques Mouradian (FRC 
1964–69) in his last monthly confidential report to the French Ministry for 
Overseas Departments and Territories, before leaving Port Vila. Less fortunately, 
however, I have to rely on fallible memory when referring to it, as I have no 
recording of this interesting document. As I recall them, the important points 
in Mouradian’s recommendations on French Government policy were as I set 
them out now.
35  Whilst maintaining all the essential features of the 1906 Convention, the Protocol introduced some 
useful improvements, including provision for setting up the Courts of First Instance and Native Courts, and 
the appointment of British and French District Agents. Most importantly, from the British viewpoint, was the 
provision that judgements of the Joint Court, the new Native Courts and the Courts of First Instance would, in 
future, be executed by joint agreement between the RCs. The Convention had stipulated that each RC should 
unilaterally carry out Joint Court judgements concerning his own nationals. In practice, as related in Jacomb, 
‘A Family Portrait,’ FRCs failed not infrequently, in the early years of the Condominium, to execute judgements 
against French citizens convicted of offences against the articles of the Convention regarding the employment 
of indigenous labourers.
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In his report of September or October 1969 Mouradian accepted the inevitability 
of independence for the New Hebrides, whilst implicitly hoping that it would be 
sufficiently far in the future for the policy he advocated to have enough time for 
fulfilment. The cornerstone of this policy was the extension of French influence 
among the indigenous population, so that, when independence ultimately came, 
French interests, both economic and cultural, would be preserved subsequently.
As could be expected from the programme of school building in the outer 
islands that was gathering pace in the 1960s, Mouradian saw education as an 
essential tool for the extension and deepening of French influence in the New 
Hebrides. This message was certainly heeded in Paris, judging by the sometimes 
aggressive way in which French schools were being implanted in the 1970s, 
with considerable pressure being exerted on villagers to accept them, even 
where there was an existing English medium school adequate for the number 
of children. This pressure could lead to friction between villagers opposing the 
introduction of a new French school, and those in favour of it, as was the case 
on west Ambrym, at Port Vato, in 1974 or 1975. This dispute reached Resident 
Commissioner level, and I recall the BRC, Roger du Boulay, taking a firm line 
with his French colleague, so as to secure the abandonment of the attempt to 
set up the controversial French school. I also recall the occasion when villagers 
in west Santo told the Assistant British District Agent that they did not want 
a consignment of canned food that a French official had left with them as an 
inducement to accept a French school. Some embarrassment was caused when 
he tactlessly returned the consignment to the French District Agency!36
In support of his report Mouradian pointed out that, unlike France, Great Britain 
had no long-term interests in the New Hebrides, and was anxious, therefore, 
to divest itself of its responsibilities in the Condominium as soon as possible. 
It was consistent with this wish that the British were advocating the unification 
of all public services, including those operated separately by France and Britain, 
in order to prepare the way for independence. Mouradian urged resistance to this 
policy, as he saw the continued unilateral operation by France of its health and 
co-operatives services, which had not inconsiderable impact on the lives of the 
Melanesians, as another means of maintaining, ever-increasing French influence.
Mouradian’s recommendations no doubt found ready acceptance in Paris, where 
a Gaullist regime, under George Pompidou (who succeeded the General in 1969) 
was to continue until M. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing was elected President of 
France in mid-1974. French opposition to constitutional advance was, of course, 
also maintained during the Pompidou presidency. It was rather ironic that, in 
36 For further details on this incident see ‘Edward Hackford Administrative Officer, 1969-1971 in Tufala 
Gavman: Reminiscences from the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides, ed. Brian J. Bresnihan and 
Keith Woodward, Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, 2002, pp. 276-284.’
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1977, Mouradian returned to the New Hebrides to draw up, in conjunction with 
a British civil servant, proposals for the unification of the national services. 
By then, of course, the French knew independence was relatively imminent.
A crucial, indeed determining, aspect of the New Hebrides political situation 
in the mid-1970s was the mistrust, akin to enmity, that existed between the 
FR, and the French community at large, on the one side, and the NP/VP on the 
other. I have already mentioned the apprehension felt in the FR and expressed 
by M. Langlois to Mr. du Boulay and myself in 1974 at the prospect of a NP 
victory in the forthcoming elections for the RA. There were good reasons for this 
apprehension. Historically, there was a long tradition of bad feeling between 
the French in the New Hebrides and the Presbyterian Mission, and the NP, the 
majority of whose adherents were Presbyterians, saw the French in the same 
light as the Mission. The land question had a great deal to do with the poor 
relations between the Presbyterian Mission and the French. The Presbyterian 
churches in Australia had become alarmed at Higginson’s land-buying activities 
in the last two decades of the nineteenth century, and the Australasian New 
Hebrides Company had been formed by churchmen in New South Wales to buy 
land in the New Hebrides to stop it from falling into French hands.37
Coming closer to our time, prominent Presbyterian AdCo Members, such as Dr. 
John Kalsakau and George Kalkoa, were spokesmen in the Council for Melanesian 
villagers opposing further alienation of land by Europeans, and this opposition 
gave rise in the 1960s and 1970s to many land disputes, mainly involving French 
planters or companies seeking to develop land in their registered ownership, or 
under claim before the Joint Court. Relations between the FR and the NP had 
been significantly worsened, moreover, by the invasion of the FR grounds on 
27 December 1973 by a crowd of NP adherents demanding the release from the 
French prison in Santo of the Rarua brothers.
As I have mentioned earlier, the success of the NP in the 1975 RA elections was 
such (and despite the electoral system being designed to ensure it did not win 
too many seats), that the FR was convinced that the NP must have achieved its 
results by means of fraud. It seemed to me then that the effect of surprise, which 
the NP’s success had on our French colleagues, was due to failure on their part 
to appreciate the basic realities of the political situation. The plain fact was that 
adherents of the various Protestant Missions comprised a substantial majority 
of the Melanesian population, and that, by 1975, the NP was supported by 
nearly all of this majority. The only significant exception was the Church of 
Christ, whose long-time leader on Ambae, Abel Bani, had close links with 
Jimmy Stevens and the Nagriamel movement, which strongly opposed the NP. 
37  The assets of the Australasian New Hebrides Company were acquired by Burns Philp & Co in the mid-
1890s, and they in turn made over these lands to the Commonwealth Government in 1906, in return for a 
subsidy to the Burns Philp mail steamers plying between Sydney and the New Hebrides.
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I do not know, however, whether all Church of Christ followers on the islands 
of Ambae, Maevo and Pentecost voted against the NP. In any case, there were 
enough Anglicans and other NP supporters on these three islands to cancel out 
Church of Christ votes for the Moderates.
Even if these three islands were taken out of the equation, there were enough 
adherents of the Presbyterian Church in the rest of the Group, together with 
the Anglicans in the Banks and Torres Islands, to secure a NP majority in the 
universal suffrage section of the Assembly, which comprised twenty-nine of the 
total forty-two seats. It was the apparent failure of the FR to grasp this essential 
fact, our colleagues’ inability to get their electoral sums right, that resulted 
in their acute disappointment with the result of the 1975 elections. They had 
obviously expected the loose anti-NP alliance to do very well or even to win. 
Their failure to do better was due, so the FR assumed, to electoral fraud by the 
NP. In fact, the Moderates had done about as well, or nearly as well, as I expected 
them to do, given their electoral potential, in terms of numbers and distribution 
of their supporters. There was just no possibility of the moderates winning a 
majority of the universal suffrage seats, unless the NP made a complete mess of 
organising their voters in the multi-seat constituencies. I admit to having been 
surprised when this party won all three Luganville, Santo seats. Whether this 
happened because (as alleged by the French) the NP had deliberately brought 
supporters into Luganville from other islands so as to increase their voting 
strength there, I honestly do not know, but they would have only been guilty of 
electoral gamesmanship because no breach of the electoral legislation would have 
been involved. Qualified electors were legally entitled, under the 1975 electoral 
laws, to change their registration from one constituency to another up to quite 
a short time prior to the date fixed for polling. Fabre and I had provided for this 
so as to facilitate participation in the elections by as many people as possible.
At some point in 1976, Jacques Fabre, whom I have mentioned fairly often in 
these memoirs, left the New Hebrides, and was replaced as Chancelier at the FR 
by Francis Doyen. I had known Doyen since about 1960, and had worked a good 
deal with him in the early 1960s during the first of his two postings at the FR, and 
particularly on the preparation of the Joint Labour Regulation. We had a very 
good relationship during those years, and I assumed that things would be much 
the same when Doyen became Chancelier. (He had returned to the New Hebrides 
a year or so earlier, and had held the post of French District Agent CD1 during 
that time.) Times had changed, however, and things were not the same. The 
advent of politics, and particularly the success of the NP, with its strident calls 
for independence, had affected relations between the Residencies. Although, 
on the surface, my relations with Doyen were cordial, the warmth of the former 
friendly co-operation in the 1960s had gone. Of necessity, most of our dealings 
were related to the political situation resulting from the 1975 elections. Doyen’s 
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suspicions and dislike of the NP were intense. This had obviously affected his 
attitude towards me, no doubt because of the belief in French circles that I had 
close links with the NP, from 1977 the Vanuaku Party (VP).
Relations between the two Administrations reached their lowest ebb at the 
end of 1977, following a year in which the VP had successively wrecked the 
first RA, boycotted the Paris Ministerial meeting, refused to take part in the 
second Assembly and, on 29 November, had declared a ‘People’s Provisional 
Government’ (PPG). The proclaimed intention of the VP to raise the flag of 
the PPG in Port Vila, Luganville and other principal centres could have led 
to violence between that party and the so-called Moderates, had not the VP 
wisely decided that discretion was the better part of valour, in the face of 
aggressive mobs of Moderates. Indeed, at about this time, there was an attack 
on the VP-supporting village of Tautu, north-east Malekula, by people from the 
Catholic villages of Wala-Rano, who backed the Moderates. There was damage 
to property, but not to persons.
Opposition to the Vanuaku Party flag-raising 
ceremony
The date, 29 November 1977, was momentous for me personally and for many 
other people, including the BRC, John Champion,38 and two of my BR colleagues. 
For me, it began before breakfast with a telephone call from Mike Dumper, the 
British Commandant of Police, who told me he had heard that the Moderates 
were planning to prevent the VP hoisting its PPG flag at the party’s office in the 
Lo Lam Building on rue Higginson.
I do not remember at what time a crowd of Moderates, mostly francophone 
New Hebrideans, but also some of the prominent French members of Tan-
Union,39 assembled in the narrow street between the Fung Kwei emporium and 
the Lo Lam Building. They were certainly there by the time I got to my office, 
or soon afterwards. I was fortunate in having a reliable source of on-the-spot 
information, as Tom Bayer, the Manager of PITCO,40 had his offices in the Lo Lam 
Building. Through the morning, he kept me in touch by telephone with what 
was happening below his windows.
38  For John Champion’s account of the 29th November disturbance see Champion 2002, ‘John S. Champion 
GMG, OBE: British Resident Commissioner, 1975–1978,’ in Tufala Gavman: Reminiscences from the Anglo-
French Condominium of the New Hebrides, ed. B.J. Bresnihan and K. Woodward, Suva: Institute of Pacific 
Studies, University of the South Pacific, pp. 152–54, pp. 150–51.
39  Formerly called the Union des Communités des Nouvelles-Hebrides or Union of New Hebrides 
Communities.
40  Pacific Islands Trust Company, one of the numerous financial organisations that had installed themselves 
in the New Hebrides from 1970 onwards in connection with the euphemistically named Finance Industry or 
tax haven.
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When it was clear that the Moderates were determined to oppose the VP flag-
raising, and by force if need be, I telephoned Walter Lini, who at that point 
(probably between nine and ten o’clock) was still at the Anglican Church 
in Tagabe, almost two miles from the town centre. I informed him that the 
Moderates had taken up position in front of the VP office, and urged him to 
cancel the proposed flag-raising. He was not to be dissuaded, however, and 
it was not long after our conversation that the VP contingent began its march 
towards town. I was not particularly surprised by my failure, as Lini no doubt 
felt the VP would lose face if it was seen to be deterred by the presence of the 
Moderates at its HQs.
It had been agreed with our French ‘partners’ that, at either Resident 
Commissioner or Commandant of Police level, the British and French police 
forces would co-operate on this day, and that the French would have officers 
in the British police station in town, so as to facilitate this co-operation. At 
about mid-morning, however, the French police withdrew, presumably upon 
instruction from the FR. This was an unfortunate and, indeed, a disastrous let-
down on the part of the French. On this, of all occasions, there should have been 
close co-operation between the two Forces, but there was none, and the British 
Commandant of Police was left with the option of doing nothing to prevent 
possibly violent confrontation between the Moderates and the VP, or taking 
action as he saw fit.
It has to be said that the FR abdicated from its joint responsibility with the 
BR for maintaining public order in Port Vila on 29 November 1977. I can only 
ascribe this to its almost pathological dislike of the VP, and apparent willingness 
to let the Moderates have a free hand against Lini. This view is borne out by 
their failure to shut down a kind of training camp, which had been set up on 
French private property near Tebakor, a mile or so north of Port Vila shortly 
before 29 November. The purpose of this camp was, apparently, to prepare 
adherents of the Moderates for the use of force against the VP. There can be no 
doubt that the FR was well aware of its existence. If the VP had been involved 
in what amounted to para-military training of this kind, which it was not, the 
BR would have instigated joint action to bring it to an end.
As the morning wore on, and it was reported that the VP contingent from 
Tagabe was getting steadily closer to the town, the British Commandant of Police 
became increasingly concerned about the possibility of a violent confrontation 
between it and the Moderates, who were carrying a variety of weapons. These 
were mostly clubs and other blunt instruments, but I was informed that the 
British Police had found a pistol on the ground after the Moderates had initially 
fled the scene.
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As the moment of crisis grew closer, I received two quite agitated telephone 
calls from Mike Dumper, to the effect that he might have to take action to avert 
a fracas. I told him I would inform the Resident Commissioner of the situation. 
When I went into Champion’s office, he was on the phone with his French 
colleague, M. Robert Gauger. It was obvious from the testy way, verging on 
annoyance, in which he spoke to ‘Robby’, that there was some disagreement 
between the two. My surmise was that Champion had complained to Gauger 
about the withdrawal of the French police, as mentioned above.
When Dumper next phoned me, within minutes of the first call, he made it 
abundantly clear that he thought the imminent arrival of the VP marchers 
necessitated urgent action. I cannot recall whether he then mentioned the use 
of tear gas, but it was possible, or even probable that he did, because I think I 
was not very surprised, when I heard, a short time later, that it had been fired. 
I advised Dumper to speak to the Resident Commissioner, as I did not feel able to 
authorise whatever action he felt was required to defuse the situation. He said 
that he would speak to Champion.
Dumper must have obtained the Resident Commissioner’s covering authorisation 
to take the action he thought to be appropriate, but neither of them told me 
what was said when this call took place. Anyway, within a very short time, Tom 
Bayer phoned me to say the British Police had dispersed the crowd of Moderates 
with tear gas.
The physical, although not the political, effects of the tear gas were short-lived. 
After their initial precipitate flight, at least some of the Moderates went the short 
distance to the British Police Headquarters building and stoned it, with what 
damage being caused, I did not learn. As tear gas had not, as far as I know, been 
used in the New Hebrides previously, the element of surprise may have been 
as significant as any physical discomfort in causing the dispersal of the crowd. 
Anyway, it was not long, perhaps only ten or fifteen minutes, before Tom Bayer 
rang me to say the Moderates had re-assembled in front of the Lo Lam building, 
still determined to deny the VP access to their offices for the flag-raising.
The VP contingent had apparently not been close enough to their goal when the 
tear gas was fired to take advantage of the temporary absence from the scene of 
the Moderates to get into the Lo Lam building. When they did finally arrive, 
a stand-off ensued. No physical confrontation occurred, as the VP, who were 
unarmed, must have realised that the Moderates were well-placed to prevent the 
projected flag-raising. Dick Baker, one of my BR colleagues, was asked to go down 
to rue Higginson, so that he could at least assess the situation and, if need arose, 
try by his presence to avert disorder breaking out. By this time, late morning, I 
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was too unwell to accompany him, as I had pneumonia, although I did not know 
it. In any case, my presence would probably not have been appreciated by the 
Moderate leaders, given my supposed close links with the VP.
In keeping with the apparent decision of the FR to hold themselves aloof from 
the events of this day, Baker has informed me that no FR officer, or French police 
were present at the stand-off between the rival groups. After some time had 
elapsed, Walter Lini decided not to press matters and retired from the scene.
At some point during the lunch-time break, I telephoned the British Base 
Hospital and arranged to see a doctor. When Dr. Makau Kalsakau examined 
me, he said that my temperature was 40o centigrade, that I had pneumonia and 
would have to be hospitalised. So I was absent from my office on that fateful 
afternoon, and for about a week afterwards.
There are two matters that I should have mentioned earlier in connection with 
the tear gas episode. The first is that the British District Agent for CD1, Tim 
Osborne, was with Mike Dumper when the tear gas was fired. To what extent 
he was involved in the decision to use it, I do not know, as I did not have an 
opportunity of talking to him after the event, but it is probable that he was 
consulted. The second is that a man from Tanna, who was in the Moderate 
crowd, was struck in the abdomen by a tear gas canister. I think I did not learn 
of this until I came out of hospital. I spoke to one of the doctors at the French 
Hospital, where the man was being treated, and was told that his wound, 
although not life-threatening, was fairly serious. That anyone should have been 
wounded in this way was, I suppose, due to the inexperience of the British 
Police in crowd control, and the use of tear gas. I presume the man made a full 
recovery, as I never heard anything to the contrary.
During the afternoon of 29 November, when I was already in hospital, a 
contingent of Moderates marched up the British Paddock to the Residency 
Offices, clamouring for the departure of Dumper and Osborne from the New 
Hebrides. Prominent among them were the Mayor of Port Vila, Remy Delaveuve, 
and rather surprisingly, George Kalsakau, who had been, until only a short time 
previously, the senior Melanesian officer in the British Police. Mr. Champion 
agreed to receive a delegation from this crowd. Apart from Delaveuve, I do not 
remember which of the Moderate leaders saw the Resident Commissioner. John 
Champion did not accept the demand that Dumper and Osborne should go, but 
promised that a commission would be set up to enquire into what had taken 
place in the morning. What subsequently occurred to prevent this promise 
being honoured has been described by Champion himself in his contribution 
to the book, Tufala Gavman, published by the University of the South Pacific 
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in 2002.41 His position had been made intolerable by the combination of four 
factors: the intransigence of the VP, the irresponsibility of the Moderates, the 
lack of co-operation from the FR and last, but not least, the apparent error of 
judgement which led to the discharge of tear gas against the Moderate protestors.
Either on the day after, or on 1 December, the French High Commissioner in 
Noumea, M. Eriau, despatched a detachment of Gardes Mobiles to Port Vila, 
apparently to prevent any outbreak of disorder resulting from the incidents of 
29 November. Eriau then put pressure on Mr. Champion to send Tim Osborne 
and Mike Dumper out of the Condominium, saying that failure to take this step 
might lead to attacks (by French people or francophones) on British persons or 
property, which he might not be able to prevent. This was a kind of blackmail, 
and quite outrageous. In the face of it, the BRC had no realistic option, other 
than compliance with Eriau’s demand. Accordingly, four or five days after 29 
November, Dumper and Osborne left Port Vila on what was officially described 
as, special leave. There were, in fact, no attacks on British persons or property, 
but the two officers concerned could have faced unpleasantness or worse, if 
they had remained in Port Vila, carrying out their normal duties.
As for myself, unhappily obliged to remain in a hospital bed, when I would have 
liked to have been supporting Champion during those difficult days, I heard it 
was being put about in French circles that my illness was of a diplomatic nature. 
I certainly received no solicitous enquiries as to my health, or hospital visits 
from any of my French colleagues.
In the event, the Commission of Enquiry promised by Champion on 29 
November did not take place, as the French Government made it clear that no 
French citizen could be summoned to give evidence before it, and the Foreign 
Office abandoned the proposal. I have no doubt that, if the Commission had sat, 
and French officials and private citizens been required to testify, the FR would 
have come out of it very badly. This may have been why the French Government 
opposed its establishment.
Within a few weeks of 29 November, it was announced that both Gauger and 
Doyen, respectively the FRC and the Chancelier, were to be replaced. They were 
succeeded by two graduates, M. Potier and M. Mermet, of the Ecole Nationale 
d’Aministration, one of the prestigious Grandes Ecoles. I never learnt what, if any 
experience either of them had had in French Overseas Territories or Departments. 
By some point in the middle of 1978, both Potier and Mermet had also gone.
41  John S. Champion, ‘John S. Champion CMB, OBE: British Resident and Commissioner, 1975–78,’ in 
Tufala Gavman: Reminiscences from the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides, ed. Brian J. Bresnihan 
and Keith Woodward, Suva: University of the South Pacific, 2002, pp. 142–54.
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Afterword: And what of education?
I have now reached the end of these memoirs. The Condominium finished 
ingloriously, amid attempted secession by some of the inhabitants of Espiritu 
Santo, and violence on Tanna. I must leave it to those who may read what I 
have written over the past year (2010–11), more than thirty years on, and my 
detailed description of constitutional development, written just before my 
departure from Port Vila in 1978 to form their own opinion as to why this was 
so.42 However, I shall hazard my own tentative analysis, based on my knowledge 
of the history and antecedents of the Condominium, and my twenty-five years 
of working with the system.
Firstly, the Condominium was set up as a pis aller arrangement, in order to 
provide the previously rather anarchic New Hebrides with a form of settled 
government, by two countries, Great Britain and France, which had been 
colonial rivals for centuries. The Joint Administration, which is a more accurate 
name for the arrangement than Condominium, had the inherent weakness of 
not being a properly unified government. On the contrary, its emphasis (as set 
out in the Anglo-French Convention of 1906) was on the two powers doing only 
the essential minimum of administration together, whilst preserving separate 
national control over their own subjects and citizens. This principle led to the 
establishment of a dualised administrative system, which left plenty of scope 
for local rivalry between the representatives of the two signatory powers.
In the early years of the Condominium, the exercise by each power of separate 
control over its own nationals and ressortissants (see note 10) led to the abuses 
described by the English lawyer, Edward Jacomb (n.d.), in his unpublished 
papers.43 Because the Convention provided for each Residency to execute on 
its own nationals the judgements of the Joint Court, Jacomb found that the FR 
frequently failed to enforce the Court’s judgements on French planters convicted 
of offences against the clauses of the Convention respecting the recruitment and 
employment of Melanesian labourers. The pressure exerted by the Presbyterian 
and Anglican Missions in Australia and Britain for these abuses to be remedied 
was one of the factors leading to the British Government calling for the revision 
of the Convention. In the Anglo-French Protocol of 6 August 1914, provision 
was made, at British insistence, for the judgements of the Joint Court, the Courts 
of First Instance, and the Native Courts to be executed by the RCs jointly.44 
Unfortunately, the Protocol, which was signed two days after the outbreak of 
the Great War, was not brought into effect until March 1922.
42  Woodward, ‘Historical Summary.’
43  Jacomb, ‘A Family Portrait.’
44  The Courts of First Instance, with jurisdiction over offences against Joint Regulations, and the Native 
Courts, which tried crime and civil cases between Melanesians, were introduced by the Protocol.
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Figure 10. Eratoka Island, also known as Hat Island, Ghost Island or 
Devil’s Island taken from aboard the Don Quixote.
Source: Photograph by Michael Allen, November 1958.
Figure 11. Jean Guiart writing up his diary in Maroo village, Emau Island.
Source: Photograph by Michael Allen, November 1958.
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The Condominium has been much criticised and mocked as a ridiculous 
arrangement. While writing these last lines, however, an interesting thought 
has struck me. We know that Britain was far from anxious to acquire additional 
colonial responsibilities by involving itself in the New Hebrides. Indeed, it might 
well have agreed to French annexation of the group in 1885, when approached 
to that end by France, but for the strong opposition voiced by the Australian 
Colonies. Since France, with more settlers, and considerable land interests 
in these islands by the early twentieth century, would not have accepted a 
British take-over, and since some form of settled government was needed, the 
Condominium was the only solution. It is my view that the indigenous people 
of the New Hebrides had reason to be thankful for the Condominium, if one 
considers the only likely alternative, French annexation. France annexed New 
Caledonia in 1853 and for many years used it as a penal colony. The Melanesian 
inhabitants or canaques (the French version of the English term kanaka) were 
not well treated under French colonial rule, and they rose against it in 1878. 
The revolt was a serious one, and considerable force had to be employed to 
suppress it. There was another, but less serious reason, rising in 1917. The 
well-known French anthropologist, Professor Jean Guiart (Figure 11),45 has 
severely criticised the treatment of the canaques, pointing out that for many 
years, and well into the twentieth century, they were subjected to a system of 
forced labour. Guiart described them as second-class citizens, although their 
political situation has been much improved over recent decades. There was, 
nevertheless, a serious outbreak of inter-racial violence in the territory in the 
mid-1980s with both Europeans and Melanesians being killed.
With the obvious exception of the abuses associated with the recruitment and 
employment of plantation labourers during the early years of the Condominium, 
the indigenous people of the New Hebrides fared much better under joint Anglo-
French administration (or lack of it) than did formerly their Melanesian cousins 
under purely French rule in New Caledonia. As Guiart, the author of several 
books and monographs about both the New Hebrides and New Caledonia, has 
notably pointed out, under the Condominium, New Hebridean villagers were 
left largely to their own devices, free to manage their own affairs with minimal 
interference by the administration, which had only a light presence on the 
ground.46 The fact that the Government in Port Vila was represented in each of 
45  Guiart has published extensively on this topic but see especially J. Guiart, 1968, ‘Le cadre social 
traditionnel et la rébellion de 1878 dans le pays de la Foa, Nouvelle-Calédonie,’ Journal de la Société des 
Océanistes 24: 97–119; Guiart, 1970, ‘Les événements de 1917 en Nouvelle-Calédonie,’ Journal de la Société des 
Océanistes 26: 265–82; Guiart, 1982, ‘One of the last colonies: New Caledonia,’ Journal of International Affairs 
36(1): 105–112; Guiart, 1985, ‘Les canaques, les caldoches et les autres,’ in Regards sur l’actualité, La crise 
calédonienne, Paris: La Documentation française 107: 18–31.
46  See J. Guiart, 1978, ‘Les Nouvelles-Hébrides,’ in Ethnologie régionale no. 1 Encyclopédie de la Pléiade, ed. J. 
Poirier, Paris: Gallimard; Guiart, 1983 [2012], La Terre est le Sang des Morts, Paris: Editions Anthropos; Guiart, 
1986, ‘La conquête et le déclin: Les plantations, cadre des relations sociales et économiques au Vanuatu, ex 
Nouvelles-Hébrides,’ Journal de la Société des Océanistes 42: 7–40.
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the four Districts by two District Agents, one British and one French, militated 
against oppressive administration. Villagers who felt aggrieved by the decisions 
or actions of one of the District Agents could complain to the other gavman or 
administration and there was some playing of one side against the other by New 
Hebrideans, although I feel the tendency towards this working the system may 
have been exaggerated, like much else about the Condominium.
In general, it can be said that the rural inhabitants of the Condominium were 
subject to very little administrative interference. The District Agents held 
sittings of the Native Court, assisted by two New Hebridean Assessors, when 
crimes were reported to them. Otherwise offences were dealt with under 
custom by chiefs and assessors. The downside of what could be regarded as 
administration by salutary neglect was that, until the post-World War II era, 
Government did very little for the Melanesian people, leaving it to the various 
Christian missions to provide, insofar as their resources permitted, rudimentary 
health and education facilities. On the other hand, the Condominium was 
not alone in this, since a similar situation existed, for example, in the British 
Solomon Islands Protectorate. It was to the credit of the French Government 
that it set up hospitals, staffed by military doctors and Catholic nuns, on Santo 
and Malekula, as well as in Port Vila.
From the 1950s onwards, government in the New Hebrides took on a more 
positive form, as development became the watchword. Both the British and 
French Governments began spending significant sums on both social and 
infrastructural development—education, health, roads, airfields and wharves. 
Local Councils were set up to encourage New Hebrideans to provide their 
communities with minor services and facilities, helped by Condominium grants. 
The fact that the Condominium was not a truly unified administration adversely 
affected the development of Local Councils, however, as most French District 
Agents showed little enthusiasm for them, and gave scant support to the efforts 
of their British colleagues to encourage and help the councils.
It was, however, in the sphere of educational development that the dual nature of 
the Condominium was most apparent, and most unfortunate, to use no stronger 
term. Needless to say, both the Convention and the Protocol made no reference 
to the education of the indigenous population. There was, therefore, no reason 
at all why such a question as to which language, English or French, should be 
taught, should be mentioned in these treaties. Yet this was the issue which, 
perhaps more than any other, highlighted the essential flaw in the 1906/14 
Anglo-French agreement that the New Hebrides should constitute a region of 
joint influence. This flaw, which can hardly be over emphasised, meant that 
the two treaties set the scene for the group to become a region of competition 
and rivalry between the two powers, because they had failed to create a unified 
system of administration.
A Political Memoir of the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides
84
The possibility that the education of Melanesian children might become a field 
of competition between the signatory powers did not emerge, or did not bother 
them, until the last thirty years before the end of the Condominium. This was 
simply because both the British and French Governments, and especially the 
former, were content to leave education to the missions. They at length realised, 
at more or less the same time in the late 1950s that mission education could not, 
for lack of resources, go far enough, and that government had to step in.
For the British, this was basically a matter of acting through the network of 
Presbyterian, Anglican, Church of Christ and village schools which covered 
the greater part of the New Hebrides, and therefore a majority of Melanesian 
children. As there was virtually no English-medium secondary education, and 
no worthwhile teacher training, the British Government would also have to start 
more or less from the beginning in these fields. My point is that, by taking over 
English-medium education from the Missions, the British Government would 
automatically ensure that most New Hebridean children would ultimately speak 
English, and come under British cultural influence, such as it was.
For France, however, it was altogether different. There were, in 1960, French 
State schools in Port Vila and Luganville, one in Isangel, Tanna and possibly 
one or two on Malekula. Apart from these institutions, the teaching of French 
was in the hands of the Catholic schools, and perhaps a few French Protestant 
Mission ones on Santo and Malekula. Thus, if France simply copied the British 
Government, and did no more than upgrade mission schools by increasing, 
or introducing financial support for them, French-educated francophone 
Melanesians would remain a minority, since the Catholics and French Protestant 
missions had far fewer adherents than the combined ‘British’ missions. From 
the French viewpoint, this was an anomalous and unacceptable situation, since 
it was inherent in the Convention and Protocol that France had equal rights in 
the New Hebrides. Beginning with the Delauney period in the early 1960s and 
accelerating under Mouradian, Langlois and Gauger, into the mid-1970s, France 
began a well-resourced programme of improving and extending education in 
French, especially through the creation of French State schools throughout the 
Condominium. As it developed, French education policy aimed at getting half of 
the children into French-medium schools, either Catholic or state run. This was 
a logical objective from France’s point of view, and one of which criticism on 
my part would be presumptuous. The implementation of the policy, however, 
inevitably brought about attempts by French District Agents to induce villagers 
to accept French schools in places where there already existed Presbyterian or 
other denominational schools.
Proposals to install a French school, where there was a Presbyterian one did not 
necessarily cause trouble, because French schools charged no fees, and parents 
with large families found it convenient to reduce the cost of educating their 
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children by putting one or more of them into the French system. Alternatively, 
as I have indicated earlier, over-vigorous attempts by French District Agents 
or education officers to obtain agreement for a French school could cause 
resentment and local disputes.
The problem of potential competition over education was inherent in the 
administrative and legal system created by the Convention and was not solved 
before the end of the Condominium. This was probably because there was no 
politically feasible solution that would have been consistent with the equal 
rights accorded to each Signatory Power by the Convention/Protocol. It is 
now academic to look at possible expedients. None of them, such as teaching 
all New Hebridean children both French and English, or teaching English in 
some islands or areas, and French in others, would have been free from serious 
objection from a political or educational standpoint. So it only remains, given 
the failure of the Condominium in this domain to ask whether, in the long run, 
it really mattered, that is, whether the lives of many New Hebrideans had been 
adversely affected.
I have not the knowledge of what happened in Vanuatu post-independence to 
answer this question satisfactorily. Perhaps the political polarisation between 
anglophone and francophone Melanesians in the years immediately preceding 
independence led to francophones suffering from some degree of discrimination 
in public service employment between 1980 and 1991, when the VP enjoyed sole 
power. If so, I have not heard of it. During most, if not all, of the years elapsing 
since 1992, francophone politicians have shared power with the anglophones, 
and no one party can govern alone, there now being a good deal of political 
fragmentation, and a lack of stable government. This factor, together with the 
continued existence of some degree of island identity consciousness, to say 
nothing of the multiplicity of religious denominations, seems likely to ensure 
the survival of democracy in Vanuatu.
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Figure 12. Keith Woodward and John Champion, the British Resident 
Commissioner at Bauerfield Airport, Port Vila, on the day of Keith’s 
departure from the New Hebrides, 1 March, 1978.
Source: Photographer unknown, supplied by Brian Bresnihan.
Figure 13. From left: Keith Woodward, Dick Baker and Brian Bresnihan 
(all colleagues in the British Administration), framed by unidentified New 
Hebrideans, including an airline official in the bottom right hand corner. 
Keith was on the point of checking in for his flight on the day of his 
departure from the New Hebrides. Bauerfield Airport, 1 March, 1978.
Source: Photographer unknown, supplied by Brian Bresnihan.
A Political Memoir of the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides 
87
Concluding thoughts
For family reasons, and because of my deteriorating sight, I sadly left the 
New Hebrides on 1 March 1978, after just less than twenty-five years in the 
Condominium (Figures 12 and 13). In later years, I have much regretted my 
decision to do this, wondering whether I could have made any useful contribution 
to the process which finally led to Independence. I have tried to console myself 
with the thought that the electoral system which I originated in 1975 is still 
in use, although it was not designed with the multiplicity of political parties 
now existing in Vanuatu in mind, and is therefore less effective.47 Perhaps the 
instability of governments which has bedevilled Vanuatu politics since the 1991 
split in the Vanu’aku Pati would not have come about had a different electoral 
system been in place. There is a danger of former Condominium administrators 
like myself being patronising about Vanuatu politics today and so I shall indulge 
myself no further on this subject. After weathering a few minor storms since 
1980, Vanuatu is still a democracy and I am glad to have played a small part 
many years ago in its evolution towards self-determination.
47  See Howard Van Trease (ed.), 1995, Melanesian Politics: Stael Blong Vanuatu, Christchurch: Macmillan 
Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, University of Canterbury and Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, University 
of South Pacific.
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Figure 14. Keith enjoying himself at a lunch party in Port Vila in March 
1980, when he paid a return visit to the New Hebrides. He is talking to 
Olla Reeve, the woman who painted the watercolour of the British Office 
(Figure 15).
Source: Photograph by Brian Bresnihan.
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Figure 15. British Administration Building, water colour, Olla Reeve,  
ca. 1977, in the collection of Brian Bresnihan.
Source: Photograph by Brian Bresnihan.
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